Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 62

Issue 3

Article 12

2012

The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens United: A
Defense of Prohibition
Roger Colinvaux

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens United: A Defense of Prohibition,
62 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 685 (2012)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol62/iss3/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

2/22/2012 5:30:46 PM

THE POLITICAL SPEECH OF CHARITIES
IN THE FACE OF CITIZENS UNITED: A
DEFENSE OF PROHIBITION
Roger Colinvaux†
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 686
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A NOBLE RULE ................. 689
A. A Brief History of the Prohibition: A
Noncontroversial Rule................................................... 690
B. Legislative Developments after Enactment ................... 697
C. Criticisms of and Reasons for the Rule ......................... 699
II. DOES CITIZENS UNITED CONDEMN THE POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES PROHIBITION? ................................................. 707
A. Introduction ................................................................... 707
B. Purpose of the Rule ........................................................ 709
1. Purpose of Section 501(c)(3) is to Define Charity
for Tax Purposes ...................................................... 709
2. Purpose of the Rule Viewed as Part of the TaxExemption System ..................................................... 712
† Roger Colinvaux, Associate Professor, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America; Legislation Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation, U.S. Congress,
2001–2008. Copyright Roger Colinvaux. My thanks to Harvey Dale and Jill Manny for asking
me to write and present this Article for the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law at the
NYU School of Law in connection with the October 2010 conference “Nonprofit Speech in the
21st Century: Time for a Change?” My thanks to Harvey Dale (again) and to Miriam Galston
for their thoughtful comments on the Article, and to the other conference participants. An
acknowledgment of Professor Laura Chisolm, whose thoughtful and inspired work continues to
inform and provoke. And a dedication to my wife, Julie, a paragon. Thanks also to Lindsey
Cloud for research assistance. A prior version of this article was available for download on the
Social Science Research Network under the title Citizens United and the Political Speech of
Charities.

685

2/22/2012 5:30:46 PM

686

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3

3. Purpose and Institutional Considerations ................. 715
C. Sanctions........................................................................ 718
D. A Ban on Speech ............................................................ 721
E. Identity Discrimination .................................................. 723
F. Existing Jurisprudence Supports the Political
Activities Prohibition..................................................... 725
1. The Rules of Speiser, Cammarano, and TWR ........... 726
2. The Speiser-Cammarano-TWR Trilogy Discussed. .. 728
III. CAUTIONARY NOTES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION .................................................. 732
A. Purpose to Penalize Speech ........................................... 733
B. The Penalty Effect and the Charitable Deduction:
Significance and Sufficiency of an Alternate Channel .. 733
C. Implications of Reliance on Constitutional Conditions
Analysis. ........................................................................ 739
D. Summary ........................................................................ 744
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE STATUS QUO ARE WANTING ......... 744
A. One Extreme: Congress May Not Restrict the
Political Activity of Charitable Organizations .............. 744
B. Assuming Change to the Prohibition, Some Limit
Should Be Contemplated ............................................... 746
C. Taxing Speech: The Most Plausible Limitation ............. 750
D. Much Ado About Nothing? It Depends on the
Deduction. ..................................................................... 753
E. Summary ........................................................................ 755
CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 755

INTRODUCTION
The rule that charitable organizations may not “participate in, or
intervene in . . . any political campaign”1 is hardly a secret. Since its
introduction as part of the Internal Revenue Code in 1954, section
501(c)(3)’s “Political Activities Prohibition,”2 as it is often called, has
been the subject of considerable scholarly debate, practical concern,
1 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). For convenience, the term “charitable organizations” is used
here to refer to any of the organization types described in section 501(c)(3), including
educational, religious, scientific, and literary.
2 See, e.g., David A. Wimmer, Curtailing the Political Influence of Section 501(c)(3)
Tax-Exempt Machines, 11 VA. TAX REV. 605, 622 (1992) (calling section 501(c)(3)’s rule that
charitable organizations cannot participate in political campaigns the “Political Activities
Prohibition”).
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and occasional political wrangling. Although the contours of the rule
may be imprecise, and enforcement by the IRS uneven—resulting in
frustration for some—arguably the rule has stood the test of time.
Like it or not, understand it or not, it is an embedded characteristic of
the charitable sector that charity and political activity are by law
incompatible.
As a practical matter, the “Political Activities Prohibition” or
“Rule” means that charities may not become partisan, or agents of
propaganda.3 The Rule keeps charitable institutions outside of the
political sphere. Charities are allowed a voice on issues, but may not
become political actors or unbalanced purveyors of opinion. Of
course, as Aristotle said long ago, “man is by nature a political
animal.”4 Thus, a rule that keeps associations of persons from
speaking politically is bound to bump up against primal forces from
time to time—and so it has proved. But, despite occasional pressure
on the Rule, there has been little realistic chance of reversing this
defining characteristic of the charitable “independent” sector by
Congress or the courts.
One reason the Rule has lasted is that, by and large, it has been
uncontroversial. There have been some loud voices raised in
resistance, but little concrete action.5 Another reason the Rule has
survived may be because, to a certain extent, it was redundant. Absent
the Rule, charities still would have faced a prohibition on some of
their political activities under campaign finance laws, which, until
recently, had long provided that corporations, including charitable
corporations, could not spend money expressly advocating for or
against a candidate for public office.6 Accordingly, for the most
political of speech, charities faced both a tax law restriction and a
campaign finance law restriction.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission,7 however, changed the legal landscape.
Citizens United held that the campaign finance rule prohibiting
corporate expenditures for express advocacy8 (or its functional
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
ARISTOLE, POLITICS AND POETICS 5 (Compass Books ed., Benjamin Jowett & Thomas
Twining trans., The Viking Press 1957) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
5 See infra Part I.C for a discussion of criticisms of the Rule.
6 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80–101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136,
159 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. I 1947)) (repealed 1948).
7 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
8 Express advocacy means to use “express terms [that] advocate the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate for federal office,” such as “‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your
ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ [or] ‘reject.’” Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).
3
4
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equivalent) is an unconstitutional burden on free speech under the
First Amendment.9 Accordingly, the tax rule now stands alone,
prohibiting not only express advocacy by charitable corporations, but
also other forms of political speech as defined by the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”).10 A challenge to the constitutionality of the
Political Activities Prohibition thus seems inevitable.11 Can the
prohibition survive Citizens United? Should it? These are the
questions addressed in this Article.12
Part I surveys the history of the political activities prohibition,
emphasizing that it was not a reactionary policy, but quite considered
and is supported by strong state interests. Part II analyzes Citizens
United in detail. It argues that if the Supreme Court reviews the
Political Activities Prohibition, Citizens United is distinguishable, and
that the Political Activities Prohibition, unlike the campaign finance
rule, is not a burden on speech and, therefore, is constitutional. Part
III discusses cautionary notes to Part II’s analysis, and explains that
even if the Political Activities Prohibition is constitutionally
defective, the important limitation on the charitable deduction
nonetheless would survive. Regardless of the constitutionality of the
Political Activities Prohibition, Part IV outlines and examines
alternatives to present law, considering practical, legal, and
administrative concerns with a regime that allows some political
activity by charitable organizations. This Part concludes that the
Political Activities Prohibition is the best option, in part because
alternatives would dilute the meaning of charity and prove even more
difficult to administer than present law.
As a side note, although the thrust of this Article is about the
Political Activities Prohibition of section 501(c)(3), the prohibition
cannot be viewed in isolation. It is closely connected to section
501(c)(3)’s lobbying limitation13 and also to provisions of the Internal
130 S. Ct. at 886.
See infra note 80 and accompanying text for a description of the type of activity
generally covered by the Rule.
11 One such challenge has been made, but faltered. See, e.g., Catholic Answers, Inc. v.
United States, 09–CV–670–IEG (AJB), 2009 WL 3320498, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009),
aff’d, 09–56926, 2011 WL 2452177 (9th Cir. June 21, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s request for a
declaration that treasury regulations apply only to activities that constitute express advocacy),
cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3440 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012) (No. 11–511).
12 See also Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and
Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 873–74 (2011) (arguing that the Political Activities Prohibition is
not likely to be held to be an unconstitutional burden). This Article generally agrees with
Professor Galston’s conclusion, but takes a different and supplementary approach.
13 An organization is not recognized under section 501(c)(3) unless “no substantial part of
the activities of [the organization] is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
9

10
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Revenue Code (the “Code”)14 that disallow ordinary and necessary
business expense deductions for lobbying and political activity,15
disallow charitable contribution deductions for contributions to an
organization that engages in political activity or substantial
lobbying,16 and provide for the tax treatment of political
organizations.17 Although full exploration of the history and relevance
of these important provisions is beyond this Article’s scope,18 much
of the discussion is relevant not just to the political activity of section
501(c)(3) organizations, but to the political and lobbying activity of
tax-exempt organizations more broadly.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A NOBLE RULE
From the original federal income tax exemption for charitable
organizations in 191319 to the present, the term “political activity” has
given rise to considerable confusion. Today, the term refers to activity
covered by the Political Activities Prohibition of section 501(c)(3)
and is distinguished from another subset of activity related to politics,
namely lobbying, which carries its own separate limitation.20
Although we now readily distinguish between the two, historically the
term “political activity” did not have the same technical meaning.21
Rather, references to political activity often included both lobbying
and campaign activity, as if the two types were part of the same topic
of concern.22 This is important because arguably, an unanswered
question in 1913 was what sort of “political activity,” broadly
14 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the “Code” are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended.
15 I.R.C. § 162(e).
16 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D).
17 I.R.C. § 527.
18 For a discussion of the effect of Citizens United on the lobbying limitation, see Lloyd
Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10
ELECTION L.J. 407, 415 (2011) (arguing “it is highly unlikely that the Citizens United decision
throws the existing federal tax law limits on lobbying by charities into immediate doubt”). For a
discussion of the effect of Citizens United on non-charitable exempt organizations, see Ellen P.
Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens
United 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 391 (2011) (reviewing questions raised by Citizens United
regarding “limits and burdens” on noncharitable tax-exempt organizations’ political speech).
19 The Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63–16 § II(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
20 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying limitation).
21 See, e.g., Elias Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the
Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439, 444 (1960) (writing about “political activity,” to mean
what today we refer to as lobbying activity, and distinguishing it from campaign activity). Also,
early references to “political activity” in legislative history were broad and included lobbying.
See, e.g., H.R. R EP. NO . 83–2681, at 18 (1954) (concluding that the laws regulating the
“political activity” of charitable organizations, including lobbying and political activity, were
not sufficient).
22 H.R. R EP . N O . 83–2681, at 95 (discussing the lobbying prohibition but using the term
political activity).
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construed, was consistent with charitable tax status. In part, the
statutory history of political activity and charity is a response to this
question, one that fashioned distinct legal categories to limit and
describe specific types of “political activity.”
A. A Brief History of the Prohibition: A Noncontroversial Rule
Senator Lyndon Johnson famously inserted the Political Activities
Prohibition as a Senate floor amendment to legislation that became
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.23 There is no direct legislative
history to the provision explaining Congress’s reasoning.24 The
Rule’s abrupt passage leads many to conclude that its rationale was
mostly political: Senator Johnson was attacked by a charity during his
reelection campaign and used the power of his office to change the
law to prohibit such attacks.25 And there is little doubt that Johnson
pushed the Rule through in the heat of a political battle. Indeed, after
a thorough review of the legislative record, one commentator
concluded that “Johnson saw a cabal of national conservative forces,
led by tax-exempt educational entities fueled by corporate donations,
arrayed against him and wanted to put a stop to the meddling of these

23
24

100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954).
The direct legislative history is succinct. Senator Johnson explained to the Senate:

Mr. President, this amendment seeks to extend the provisions of section 501 of the
House bill, denying tax-exempt status to not only those people who influence
legislation but also to those who intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for any public office. I have discussed the matter with the chairman of the
committee, the minority ranking member of the committee, and several other
members of the committee, and I understand that the amendment is acceptable to
them. I hope the chairman will take it to conference, and that it will be included in
the final bill which Congress passes.
Id.
25 See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 603 (10th ed.
2011) (“[Senator Johnson] offered the amendment out of concern that funds provided by a
charitable foundation were being used to help finance the campaign of an opponent in a primary
election.”); JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 261 (2d ed. 2006) (internal citation omitted) (“The conventional wisdom is
that Senator Johnson was out to curb the activities of a Texas foundation which had provided
indirect financial support to his opponent in a senatorial primary election campaign.”); Oliver A.
Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral Politics by Charitable
Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 24
(2003) (“Commentators have explained that Senator Johnson was motivated by the activities of
charities allied to his opponent in a recent campaign.”); Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in
the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by
Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733, 768 (2001) (noting that Johnson wanted to prohibit certain taxexempt entities from intervening in political campaigns, in part, because he “wanted to stomp
out a potential threat in his own back yard”).
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foreign interlopers.”26 Enactment of the Political Activities
Prohibition was his weapon of choice.
Notwithstanding the circumstances of the Rule’s enactment,
however, the broader historical record offers a more compelling story
of the origin of the Rule than the reaction of a single skillful Senator
to a political problem. Although the absence of direct legislative
history is accurate, a view often implicit (and sometimes explicit) in
some discussions of the Rule27 is that, in part because of the abrupt
fashion in which the Rule was enacted, the rationale is uncertain, and
we are, for the most part, supplying reasons for Congress’ actions
after the fact. Importantly, here, the implication may be that the Rule
was adopted ad hoc, and therefore should be changed, or if not
changed, perhaps treated with less reverence than a more fully
reasoned rule.
Although this is an important objection to the Rule, it overstates
the significance of both the barren legislative history and Johnson’s
self-interest. Legislators often act with selfish motives and
consistently fail fully to explain their actions for the record. But such
facts do not necessarily undermine a law’s broader purposes or intent.
In the case of the Political Activities Prohibition, for example, the
question of charity and politics did not arise suddenly in the summer
O’Daniel, supra note 25, at 768.
See, e.g., NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT:
PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 116 (2011) (footnote omitted) (“The politically
expedient and partisan impetuses for the proscription on political campaign speech were perhaps
a significant reason that Congress never clearly articulated a comprehensive, broadly acceptable
rationale as to why the statutory ban was ‘sound tax policy.’ That gap left it ripe for
academicians later to justify the gag rule. Their arguments necessarily are after-the-fact
rationalizations and speculations, largely based on asserted public policy grounds, more than
rationales supported by legislative history.”); John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The
Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 267, 285–86
(Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“It is generally agreed that no
cogent, consistent rationale for the various restrictions on political activity found in §501(c)(3)
and related provisions can be unearthed in the legislative record of their enactment. Rather, the
constraints were adopted piecemeal, often with little discussion, and, in the case of the
campaigning ban, as an apparently ad hoc response to a perceived affront to the lawmakers who
sponsored the bill.”); Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech, and
the Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405, 413 (2009) (citing
briefly the “little legislative history” and the “generally accepted” facts that led Johnson to
introduce the amendment); Siri Mielke Buller, Lobbying and Political Restrictions on §
501(c)(3) Organizations: A Guide for Compliance in the Wake of Increased IRS Examination,
52 S.D. L. REV. 136, 143 (2007) (discussing briefly that the 1954 amendment restricting
political activity was Johnson’s doing and that it remains in the current code); Houck, supra
note 25, at 81 (“The Internal Revenue Code restraints on the political activities of charities have
been in evolution, and in dispute, for nearly a century. They represent no grand plan, but rather a
design arrived at in pieces by the impulses of the moment. They have been looking for a reason
since the time they first appeared, and it was half a century before Congress even attempted one.
Reading their histories, one is struck by the fact that each of the limitations, in a different
climate, could have come out quite differently.”).
26
27
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of 1954. Rather, it was an issue that had dogged charitable tax status
from the inception of the federal income tax exemption for charitable
organizations.
From the beginning in 1913, there was considerable uncertainty
about the relationship of charity to political activity as reflected in the
common law of charitable trusts. As Professor Houck explains, “By
the early twentieth century . . . the English rule [on political activity]
and its applications had evolved to the point where political activity—
legislative or electoral, exclusive or ancillary—was fatal [to charitable
status].”28 Houck also notes, however, that the majority American rule
diverged from the English approach to embrace the use of political
means to secure charitable ends.29 Likewise, Professor Chisolm,
discussing the common law of trusts, concluded that:
[w]hat can be derived from the cases is the principle that at
common law, political purposes are not charitable purposes;
what the cases do not necessarily establish is that the use of
political means (even arguably partisan political means) to
achieve a charitable end nullifies the charitable character of
that end at common law.30
Uncertainty about the relationship of political activity and charity
did not take long. In 1917, Congress provided for a deduction from
federal income taxes for contributions to charitable organizations.31 In
order to determine which organizations were eligible to receive
charitable contributions, the Treasury adopted a regulation in 1919
providing that “associations formed to disseminate controversial or
partisan propaganda are not educational within the meaning of the
statute.”32 Although the basis for the regulation is unclear,33 it shows
that the Treasury was skeptical from the beginning that partisan
propaganda could be charitable activity, despite the absence of any
formal restriction in the statute.
Houck, supra note 25, at 5.
Id. at 7–8.
30 Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 346 (1990); see also Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the
IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ.
L. REV. 217, 252–53 (1992) (arguing that campaign intervention that furthers the organization’s
mission is consistent with the common law on charitable trusts).
31 War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65–50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
32 T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 285 (1919).
33 Houck, supra note 25, at 9. Houck described the early interpretive rulings of the
Treasury as initially recognizing political ends as charitable before changing course and
deciding that “[p]ropaganda is that which propagates the tenets or principles of a particular
doctrine by zealous dissemination” and thus was not for the public benefit. Id. at 10 (quotations
and citations omitted). Subsequent decisions struggled to maintain the propaganda-educational
distinction. Id. at 10–12
28
29
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The distrust was not limited to the executive branch. In Slee v.
Commissioner,34 Judge Learned Hand ruled that an organization
formed to provide information about birth control acted contrary to its
charitable tax exemption when it lobbied to change the birth control
laws.35 Judge Hand famously held that “[p]olitical agitation as such is
outside the statute, however innocent the aim.”36
Inevitably, Congress was drawn into the debate. In 1934, Congress
drew an initial line in the Code by requiring that “no substantial part”
of a charitable organization’s activities could be “carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”37 This
lobbying limitation was prompted by a charity’s high profile
opposition to the New Deal legislation.38 Accordingly, the response
ultimately enacted was directed to legislative and not campaign
activity. Congress was aware, however, of the distinction between the
two subsets of “political activity.” While debating the lobbying limit,
the Senate in 1934 initially passed language similar to the later
Johnson Amendment: to wit, that no “substantial part” of a charity’s
activities may be “participation in partisan politics.”39 Congress as a
whole, however, considered the Senate language too broad and struck
it in conference.40 Thus, the 1934 legislation severely limited one type
of political activity—lobbying—but left open for another day the
issue of campaign intervention. That other day came twenty years
42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
Id. at 186.
36 Id. at 185. Professor Houck described the cases that followed Slee as limiting its reach.
Houck, supra note 25, at 14–15.
37 26 U.S.C. § 103(6) (1934) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006)); see
HOPKINS, supra note 25, at 578–79 for a description of the sparse legislative history of the 1934
legislation, which was also a floor amendment.
38 See Houck, supra note 25, at 16–23 (explaining how the National Economy League
urged President Hoover to oppose increased government spending on veterans’ benefits).
39 S. REP. NO. 73–558, at 26 (1934).
40 See H.R. REP. NO. 73–1385, at 3–4 (1934) (Conf. Rep.) (showing the House and Senate
agreeing to more limited language: “no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation”). Representative Samuel B. Hill
explained:
34
35

The Senate denied a deduction for contributions made to certain organizations, a
substantial part of the activities of which was participation in partisan politics or
carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. We were
afraid this provision was too broad, and we succeeded in getting the Senate conferees
to eliminate organizations, a substantial part of the activities of which was
participation in partisan politics.
78 CONG. REC. 7729, 7831 (1934); see also Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly,
Election Year Issues, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 335, 336 (2001), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf (“The provision . . . was deleted in conference,
so that only the lobbying restriction remained.”).
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later via the Johnson Amendment, in which Congress returned to the
1934 Senate language (except without an allowance for insubstantial
political activity).41 The Johnson Amendment, to a certain extent,
marked a continuation or culmination—at a glacial legislative pace—
of the discussion about politics and charity.
As chronicled by Professor Ann Murphy, Congress’s enactment of
the Johnson Amendment is best understood not by the relative
absence of direct legislative history, but rather in the context of wider
events,42 including the historical tension that had been ongoing in the
Treasury, the courts, and the legislature since early in the century.
For example, prior to enactment of the Johnson Amendment, 43
Congress had been holding extensive public hearings that investigated
the political activities of charitable organizations. In 1952, the House
of Representatives formed a special committee to investigate taxexempt foundations and other charities,44 known as the “Cox
Committee.”45 Specifically, the committee was charged with
determining:
which . . . foundations . . . are using their resources for
purposes other than the purposes for which they were
established, and especially to determine which . . .
foundations . . . are using their resources for un-American and
subversive activities or for purposes not in the interest or
tradition of the United States.46
Then, a new committee (the “Reece Committee”) was formed to
continue the work of the Cox Committee.47 The Reece Committee
was charged with essentially the same task as the Cox Committee. It
was to:

41 There is evidence that Johnson’s staff was aware of the history of the 1934 amendment.
O’Daniel, supra note 25, at 764–65. The history was described in the statement by the IRS
before the Reece Committee, which appeared in Johnson’s files with handwritten transcriptions,
“presumably made by a Johnson staffer.” Id. at 765.
42 Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate-Never the Twain Shall
Meet?, 1 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 35, 53 (2003) (footnote omitted) (“[W]hen Senator Johnson
proposed his amendment . . . it is not surprising that it was adopted verbatim without hearings or
testimony. Both sides of the political fence were disturbed by the potential of non-profit groups
to wield political power.”).
43 Johnson first became involved in the issue because of a letter he received on May 27,
1954, and proposed his Amendment on the Senate floor on July 2, 1954. O’Daniel, supra note
25, at 760–65.
44 H.R. Res. 561, 82d Cong., 98 Cong. Rec. 3489 (1952) (enacted).
45 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 1 (1954).
46 H.R. Res. 561, 82d Cong., 98 Cong. Rec. 3489 (1952) (enacted).
47 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 1 (1954).
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conduct a full and complete investigation and study of
educational and philanthropic foundations and other
comparable organizations which are exempt from Federal
income taxation to determine if any foundations and
organizations are using their resources for purposes other
than the purposes for which they were established, and
especially to determine which such foundations and
organizations are using their resources for un-American and
subversive activities; for political purposes; propaganda, or
attempts to influence legislation.48
The Reece Committee held sixteen hearings,49 the last of which
occurred the day Senator Johnson first proposed his political activities
amendment.50 In its final written report, the Reece Committee
concluded that:
It is the opinion of this Committee that the wording of the tax
law regarding the prohibition of political activity should be
carefully re-examined. We recognize that it is extremely
difficult to draw the line between what should be permissible
and what should not. Nevertheless, the present rule, as
interpreted by the courts, permits far too much license. While
further study may be indicated, we are inclined to support the
suggestion that the limiting conditions of the present statute
be dropped—those which restrict to the prohibition of
political activity “to influence legislation” and those which
condemn only if a “substantial” part of the foundation’s
funds are so used. These restrictions make the entire
prohibition meaningless. We advocate the complete exclusion
of political activity, leaving it to the courts to apply the
maxim of de minimis no curat lex. Carefully devised
exceptions to this general prohibition against political activity
might be made in the case of certain special types of
organizations, such as bar associations.51
The excerpt is revealing. It is a critique of the prevailing “prohibition
on political activity,”52 which at the time53 included only the lobbying
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2.
50 O’Daniel, supra note 25, at 765.
51 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 219 (first, second, and fifth instances of emphasis added).
52 Id.
53 The Committee’s final report was released in December 1954, after passage of the
Johnson Amendment, though apparently without taking it into account. Id. This could be
ignorance of the new rule or it could be implicit support for it. It also could be that the report
48
49
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limit. In effect, the Reece Committee was saying that the then present
rule did not go nearly far enough and urged changes to eliminate two
loopholes. The first loophole was that the restriction covered only
lobbying. Therefore, the Reece Committee said, the provision should
be broadened in scope to cover all political activity, i.e., the language
restricting the “prohibition” to activities “to influence legislation”
should be “dropped.”54 The second loophole was that the law
permitted insubstantial lobbying. This too the Reece Committee said
should be changed, by eliminating the “substantial part” language.55
These two loopholes, the Reece Committee said, “make the entire
prohibition meaningless.”56 And so after months of hearings and
agitation, the Reece Committee expressed the exact verdict reached
by Senator Johnson, and, in turn, Congress: that politics and charity
are incompatible.
So although the direct legislative record of the Political Activities
Prohibition is sparse, the political and historical context that gave rise
to enactment of the rule largely supports its adoption.57 The two years
prior to the Rule’s enactment were notable for distrust of foundations
and other charitable organizations and concern over their “political”
involvement, broadly construed. Looking back to earlier in the
century, the historical experience of charity and politics was
characterized by suspicion and gradual retrenchment. Shortly after
enactment of the income tax exemption and the charitable deduction,
the Treasury Department and the courts both expressed doubt
regarding the compatibility of charity and politics, and eventually,
Congress followed suit.58 Rather than being an ad hoc overreaction to
one man’s political problem, the Rule is more fairly characterized as
the product of debate occurring over decades (if not longer).59 Indeed,

was drafted mostly before enactment of the Rule but published afterward. In any case, there is
little question but that the climate of the time was in favor of restrictions on the “political
activity” of charitable organizations. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (discussing
the circumstances surrounding the Johnson Amendment).
54 H.R. REP. NO. 83–2681, at 219.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See supra note 42 (noting that the climate supported the Johnson Amendment).
58 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text (discussing the progression of attitudes).
59 Of course, there were and are questions about precisely what conduct was covered or
intended to be covered by the legislative language of 1934 and of 1954. See Houck, supra note
25, at 43 (noting a circuit court’s failure to provide a citation supporting its elucidation of the
purposes of the 1934 and 1954 amendments and asserting that “given the legislative history of
the . . . amendments, it would have been hard-pressed to do so”). But this does not obscure the
central point that it is best to view the Johnson Amendment as a culmination of much that had
preceded it. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that the climate supported the
Johnson Amendment).
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the ease of passage and subsequent lack of controversy regarding the
Rule support the idea that by the time of its enactment it was a
relatively uncontroversial proposition that charities should not be
allowed to engage in political activity, broadly defined.
B. Legislative Developments after Enactment
The Political Activities Prohibition has been strengthened and
reaffirmed by Congress over time. Congress revisited the subject of
political activity and charity in 1969 and 1987, each time
substantiating the thrust of the Rule. In the landmark Tax Reform Act
of 1969,60 Congress codified the distinction between public charity
and private foundation, and subjected private foundations to a distinct
anti-abuse regime.61 Included in the new rules was an excise tax on
the political (and lobbying) activities of private foundations, which
applied in addition to the loss of tax-exempt status.62 Also in 1969,
Congress completed the work of the Johnson Amendment by
codifying a 1958 Treasury regulation,63 which had provided that no
charitable deduction is allowed for contributions to organizations that
violate the Political Activities Prohibition of section 501(c)(3).64 It is
significant both that the Department of Treasury, on its own authority,
adopted this gap-filling rule in 1958, and that Congress reaffirmed it
in the statute with little-to-no fanfare over a decade later.65
The 1987 legislation was the outcome of oversight hearings
chaired by Congressman J.J. Pickle, Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Subcommittee on Oversight.66 During the hearings, the
Political Activities Prohibition was strongly supported by the
Treasury, the current and a former IRS Commissioner, the American
Pub. L. No. 91–172, 83 Stat. 487.
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, 29–62 (Joint Comm. Print 1970) (discussing the excise tax
included in the Tax Reform Act of 1969).
62 See I.R.C. § 4945 (2006) (imposing 20 percent excise tax on amounts paid or incurred
by private foundations “to carry on propaganda, or otherwise to attempt, to influence legislation
. . . [or] to influence the outcome of any specific public election, or to carry on, directly or
indirectly, any voter registration drive”).
63 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–172, 83 Stat. 487, 553 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 172) (“the term ‘charitable contribution’ means a contribution or gift to or for the use
of . . . a corporation, trust or community chest, fund, or foundation . . . no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation,
and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office”).
64 T.D. 6285, 1958–1 C.B. 127, 130 (discussing the regulation that provided substantially
similar language as the later Tax Reform Act of 1969).
65 There does not appear to be any legislative history that explains the change.
66 Lobbying and Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. (1987).
60
61
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Bar Association and various other external stakeholders.67 The Rule
was criticized by a number of organizations,68 but, despite the
criticism, Congress strengthened the Rule by giving the IRS
additional enforcement tools.69 First, Congress clarified that the Rule
applied to actions “in opposition to” a candidate as well as “on behalf
of” a candidate.70 Second, Congress provided that when an
organization loses its status as a charitable organization, it could not
subsequently seek tax exemption under section 501(c)(4) of the
Code.71 Third, Congress imposed a new excise tax on expenditures in
violation of the Rule.72 Finally, Congress enhanced the audit and
enforcement procedures available to the IRS.73 Congress was clear
that the Political Activities Prohibition should not be weakened.74
67 See id. at 88 (prepared statement of Roger Mentz, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy of
the Department of the Treasury) (stating that the political campaign activity prohibition was
“sound tax policy” because there “is little to be said in favor of a general government subsidy of
political campaigns” and that the Treasury “supports continuation of this prohibition”); id. at
95–100 (prepared statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs, Jr., Comm’r of Internal Revenue)
(indicating the IRS supported continuation of the restrictions); id. at 130 (statement of John B.
Jones, Jr., Chairman of Taxation at the American Bar Association) (indicating that because
political activities are easier to objectively define than lobbying activities, policy makers “can
be more Draconian and take stronger positions” to curb political activities); id. at 222–36
(statement of former Comm’r of Internal Revenue Sheldon S. Cohen) (supporting the
restrictions).
68 See id. at 247 (prepared statement of Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., President, The Heritage
Foundation) (stating that “repeal of the lobbying rules . . . . would signal a new openness—a
welcomeness if you will—to charities, to schools, to educational institutions, and to churches, to
assume a rightful role in the legislative arena”); id. at 426 (prepared statement of United States
Catholic Conference) (arguing that “[t]he current broad IRS interpretation of the restriction has
a substantial chilling effect on the role of churches and religious organizations in discussing not
only particular candidates’ views on issues of importance to members of the faith, but also in
discussing the issues themselves”).
69 The 1987 House Committee Report accompanying the legislation acknowledged that
revocation of charitable status alone might not deter many organizations, “particularly if the
organization cease[d] operations after it has diverted all its assets to improper purposes” and
therefore an additional excise tax and audit procedures were warranted. H.R. REP. NO. 100–391,
at 1624 (1987).
70 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–203, § 10711(a), 101
Stat. 1330–464 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
71 Id. at § 10711(b) (codified at I.R.C. § 504(a)(2)) (amending provision that organizations
ceasing to qualify for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) for substantial lobbying are ineligible
for section 501(c)(4) status to include organizations that lose qualification for substantial
political activities). Section 501(c)(4) provides for federal income tax exemption for “social
welfare” organizations, but contributions to such organizations are not deductible as charitable
contributions. I.R.C. § 504(c)(4).
72 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 10712(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 4955) (imposing a
10 percent excise tax on political expenditures by section 501(c)(3) organizations).
73 Id. at § 10713(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 7409) (authorizing civil action on behalf of the
United States to enjoin flagrant violations); id. at § 10713(b) (codified at I.R.C. § 6852)
(authorizing immediate assessments for flagrant violations).
74 See id. at 1624 (“The adoption of the excise tax sanction does not modify the presentlaw rule that an organization does not qualify for tax-exempt status as a charitable organization,
and is not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions, unless the organization does not
participate in, or intervene in, any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any
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In short, since 1954, apart from some modest legislative
enhancements, Congress has, with full knowledge of this fundamental
principle of charitable tax law, left the Political Activities Prohibition
alone.
C. Criticisms of and Reasons for the Rule
Over time, there have been attacks on the Political Activities
Prohibition. Criticism comes essentially in three forms, relating either
to mission, guidance, or enforcement.
Regarding mission, some charitable organizations, especially some
churches, may see it as their mission to speak about issues of the day.
Although the Rule allows charities to speak on issues,75 such
organizations believe that the Rule compromises their mission by
denying the organization the ability to connect passion on the issues
to the voting booth.76 There has been considerable scholarship
addressing whether the Rule should be relaxed for such organizations,
and whether the Rule could withstand a constitutional challenge under
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.77 To the extent there

candidate for public office.”).
75 See I.R.S., TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, Pub. No.
1828, at 6 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf (“Churches and
religious organizations may, however, involve themselves in issues of public policy without the
activity being considered as lobbying. For example, churches may conduct educational
meetings, prepare and distribute educational materials, or otherwise consider public policy
issues in an educational manner without jeopardizing their tax-exempt status.”).
76 See, e.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 27, at 7 (noting spiritual leaders may “feel
theologically compelled to engage in political campaign speech”); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer,
Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89
B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1168–69 (2009) (footnote omitted) (noting that “[m]any religious faiths,
perhaps all, view the transmission of a holistic worldview that impacts all aspects of their
adherents’ lives as an integral part of their mission. Therefore it would not be surprising to find
that some houses of worship believe instructing their congregations with respect to political
involvement to be as important to their religious teaching as instructing them on personal
relationships or finances.”); see also Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3)
Requirements for Religious Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 56 (2002) (statement of D. James Kennedy, Coral
Ridge Ministries President) (noting that “[e]ven addressing moral concerns, such as abortion,
from the pulpit during an election campaign may violate the IRS rule if abortion, for example, is
under debate in the campaign. With so much uncertainty and so much at risk, silence is,
regrettably, the only option for the minister who wants to ensure that the IRS does not open a
file on his church.”).
77 See generally CRIMM & WINER, supra note 27 (providing a thorough and penetrating
analysis of the First Amendment issues raised by the Rule with respect to houses of worship);
see also Mayer, supra note 76, at 1140 n.14 (collecting articles); id. at 1215 (arguing that as
currently applied to “sermon[s] delivered during a house of worship’s regular service,” the
prohibition would survive a Free Exercise challenge, but that such a challenge would be
successful under the higher standard imposed by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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have been serious recent legislative challenges to the Rule, they have
occurred due to mission concerns.78
Mission concerns go straight to the heart of the Rule. Other
concerns are less direct. One of the most common complaints is that
the Rule is imprecise. For charities that want to engage in activity that
may be close to the political activity line, the absence of a bright line,
and what is asserted to be insufficient guidance, provokes dissent.79
Notwithstanding such complaints, there is a canon of guidance
published by the IRS explaining the parameters of the Rule,80 and
some courts have also weighed in.81 Criticism about lack of guidance
is to a certain extent criticism of the lack of a bright line, or way of
knowing in advance whether a contemplated activity is prohibited.
Thus, the objection is partly directed to the overall facts and
circumstances approach to the prohibition and the resulting lack of
“yes or no” answers to questions about political activity.82
Accordingly, some have suggested that the IRS should adopt a series
of safe harbors.83 Others have urged that political activity be treated
78 Since 1987, a number of bills have been introduced in Congress to relax the Rule, but
none has made it out of Committee. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the
Ban on Political Activity by Charities, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 n.8 (2007) (listing bills
from the 107th through the 110th Congresses). The House Committee on Ways and Means took
up legislation on the subject in 2004, but it proved controversial and was eventually dropped.
H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 692 (2004). The safe harbor provision, inserted as part of a much
larger tax bill, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, would have allowed churches to keep
charitable tax status for up to three violations of the prohibition, but the church would be
subjected to tax based on its gross income, with the rate of tax increasing for each violation. Id.
In the interest of disclosure, the author, at the time Counsel to the Congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation for tax-exempt organization matters, helped to draft the legislation.
79 See, e.g., Kay Guinane, Wanted: A Bright-Line Test Defining Prohibited Intervention in
Elections by 501(c)(3) Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 142, 143 (2007) (arguing that
the current standard is too vague).
80 See Rev. Rul. 2007–41, 2007–1 C.B. 1421 (providing twenty-one examples of
permitted and prohibited voter education activities, voter registration, candidate appearances,
issue advocacy, rental of facilities, provision of mailing lists, use of websites and other
activities); Rev. Rul. 86–95, 1986–2 C.B. 73 (allowing a series of public forums if the forum
and content are neutral); Rev. Rul. 80–282, 1980–2 C.B. 178 (addressing factors that show bias
in the timing and distribution of voter guides); Rev. Rul. 78–248, 1978–1 C.B. 154 (providing
guidance on the permitted content and structure of candidate questionnaires); Rev. Rul. 74–574,
1974–2 C.B. 161 (allowing sponsoring of candidate debates and forums that are educational and
impartial); Rev. Rul. 67–71, 1967–1 C.B. 125 (providing that the evaluation of the
qualifications of candidates or support for a slate of candidates violates the prohibition); Rev.
Rul. 66–256, 1966–2 C.B. 210 (allowing sponsoring of candidate debates and forums that are
educational and impartial).
81 See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y. v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876, 881–82 (2d Cir. 1988)
(finding that the rating of judicial candidates on a nonpartisan basis violated the Rule).
82 See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous
for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1350 (2007) (“The facts and
circumstances approach has been widely criticized and poses significant problems for 501(c)(3)
organizations.”).
83 See Letter from Ellen Aprill, Professor at Loyola Law Sch., to the Comm’r of The
Internal Revenue Serv. et al. (Nov. 29, 2005), reprinted in Loyola Professor Suggests IRS Issue
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similar to lobbying.84 Relatedly, IRS enforcement of the Rule
generates controversy through allegations of uneven enforcement85 or
political bias.86
Although such criticisms of the Rule are important, they should be
put into the context of the charitable sector as a whole by considering
which types of section 501(c)(3) organizations are most directly
affected by the Rule. Generally, these are the organizations that either
are compelled by their mission (or believe they are so compelled) to
participate in politics, or advocacy-oriented organizations. The first
type is somewhat exceptional, legally and practically.87 The second
type, however, is the Rule’s precise target. Advocacy organizations,
by their very nature, live on the line between campaign intervention
and advocacy, between lobbying and education. It harkens back to the
Reece Committee’s acknowledgement “that it is extremely difficult to
draw the line between what should be permissible and what should
not,”88 and so it has proved. But that there is activity around the line
should come as no surprise. More important is that the frustration
comes from just one segment of the charitable sector, which is just
that, a segment. Notable is the relative quiescence with which the rest
of the charitable sector, and the public, have accepted the Rule.89

Guidance on Charities and Political Activity, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 2, 2005, available at
LEXIS, 2005 TNT 231–18 (providing letter urging guidance); Loyola Professor Proposes Safe
Harbors for Political Campaign Activity by 501(c)(3) Groups, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 2,
2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 231–19 (providing enclosure to Professor Aprill’s letter
listing four specific safe harbors); Mayer, supra note 78, at 25 (arguing that the IRS should
“create bright lines and safe harbors wherever possible”).
84 See Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participation in Political Campaigns by
Charities Essential to Their Vitality and Democracy? A Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U. R ICH .
L. R EV. 1057, 1077 (2008) (arguing that “federal tax law could permit charitable entities to
engage in electioneering to the same degree that they may engage in lobbying—as an
insubstantial part of their total activity”).
85 See Mayer, supra note 78, at 7–13 (summarizing the IRS’s recent enforcement efforts);
Tobin, supra note 82, at 1354 (“The current enforcement regime creates uncertainty and has the
potential for political manipulation.”).
86 See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REP. OF INVESTIGATION OF
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATION MATTERS 19 (Comm. Print 2000) (nothing that “[w]hile the Joint Committee
staff found no credible evidence of political bias in the IRS’s selection of tax-exempt
organizations . . . [it] did identify certain procedural and substantive problems . . . that may have
contributed to a perception of unfairness”); Mayer, supra note 78, at 4–5 (discussing allegations
of partisan bias).
87 To examine the claims of religious organizations is beyond the scope of this Article, but
there is considerable scholarship on the issue. See, e.g., C RIMM & WINER , supra note 27, at
280–81, 315–16 (noting that legal authorities generally pertinent to analysis of the
constitutionality of the Rule may not fully control in the context of houses of worship).
88 H.R. Rep. No. 83–2681, at 219 (1954).
89 Broadly speaking, the Rule is largely accepted by charitable organizations and the
public. See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 314 (noting that “the prohibition has received little
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This is because there are good reasons for the Rule, which explain
not only its enactment, but its staying power. Although there is,
without question, no unequivocal statement as to what Congress
intended in 1913, 1917, 1934, or 1954 when it enacted the provisions
for the tax-exempt status for charities, the deductibility of charitable
contributions, the lobbying rule, or the Political Activities Prohibition,
the restrictions on political and lobbying activity were no accident.
The prevailing concern was definitional, that such activities were
generally inconsistent with charity, as defined by Congress. Consider
the following statements by Congress, the Treasury Department, and
the courts:
(1) The Treasury in 1919: “[A]ssociations formed to
disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not
educational within the meaning of the statute.”90
(2) The Treasury in 1920: “It is a matter of common
knowledge that propaganda in the popular sense is
disseminated not primarily to benefit the individual at whom
it is directed, but to accomplish the purpose or purposes of
the person instigating it.”91
(3) Circuit Judge, Learned Hand in 1930: “Political agitation
as such is outside the statute, however innocent the aim . . . .
Controversies of that sort must be conducted without public
subvention: the Treasury stands aside from them.”92
(4) Congress in 1954: “The foundations are free to do as they
please with the public funds at their command, so long as
they do not transgress certain rules of law . . . . Political
propaganda, for example is proscribed.”93

attention”). There is no sense that charities find the Rule to be especially constraining: hospitals
are more concerned with other aspects of charity law to be worrying about engaging in partisan
activity. Colleges and universities have not argued that they should be allowed to engage in
politics. Nor have social service organizations, cultural organizations, or even private
foundations thought to place modifying or repealing the Rule on the agenda. (Lobbying of
course is a different matter.) Id. (noting the extensive literature criticizing the lobbying
restrictions). Support for change to the Rule also does not appear forthcoming from the public at
large.
90 T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 285 (1919).
91 S. 1362, 2 C.B. 152, 154 (1920).
92 Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).
93 H.R. Rep. No. 83–2681, at 22.
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(5) Congress in 1954: “[W]hen a proposed activity may have
political implications, we cannot see any reason why public
funds should be used when any political impact may result.”94
Although these statements do not amount to any single rationale
for the Rule,95 nevertheless, Congress uses the Rule to define charity
for tax purposes. In doing so, it expresses a number of important and
related policies, all of which serve the fundamental judgment that a
political purpose is not a charitable purpose, and that political activity
may not serve a charitable purpose.
For instance, because of the Rule, a charitable section 501(c)(3)
organization must focus on charitable not political purposes and must
be free of partisanship. If education is the purpose of an organization,
activities must be educational, and not veer into propaganda.96 The
Rule is also an important defense mechanism because it protects
charities from political capture and the serving of private interests.
94 Id. at 219. The report reiterated this rationale for a Political Activities Prohibition,
stating that political activity by charitable organizations amounted to a “mis-use of public trust
funds.” Id. at 18.
95 In recent years, consensus appears to have emerged that, in general, there are three lines
of justification for the Rule with varying degrees of resonance. First is the idea that the federal
government should remain neutral in political affairs, or the “nonsubvention principle.” The
principle’s pedigree is Judge Learned Hand’s statement in Slee that “[c]ontroversies of that sort
[i.e., political agitation] must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside
from them.” 42 F.2d at 185. Second, the Rule has been justified as a means of supporting the
private benefit doctrine: namely, political activity is viewed as an activity for private gain and
not for public benefit, and therefore should not be subsidized. Chisolm, supra note 30, at 358–
59. Third, charity, by definition, just does not include political activity (including lobbying).
See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign Activity
by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1090–92 (2007) (summarizing
and responding to the argument that electioneering by charitable entities should be forbidden
because political activities are not charitable); Chisolm, supra note 30, at 359–62 (same).
Each of those rationales has been criticized, as, in general, insufficient to support the Rule.
Buckles, supra note 95, at 1078–92 (addressing the three justifications for the Rule and arguing
they are not sufficient to prohibit all charitable entities from engaging in political activities). The
neutrality rationale is perhaps the easiest to criticize. Neutrality can be maintained equally
effectively with a prohibition or its opposite—unlimited political activity for all charities. In
either case, government remains “neutral.” Regardless, each of the three rationales seems to be a
variation on the definitional theme, with neutrality and preventing private benefit being
derivative theories. As Judge Hand said, if “[p]olitical agitation as such is outside the statute,”
then it follows that “the Treasury stands aside from them,” i.e., does not subsidize. Slee, 42 F.2d
at 185. In other words, the neutrality rationale is little more than another way to assert that
charity is defined not to include political activity; i.e., public funds are not to be used or spent on
political activity. It follows quite naturally that what is not charity will not be supported by the
charitable tax benefits; the Treasury will “stand aside” from noncharitable activity and not
“provide a subsidy” for it. Similarly, the no-private-benefit rationale is yet another way to say
the same or a like thing. The no-private-benefit rule itself is derived from the charitable purpose
requirement as an organization cannot primarily be charitable if it is operated primarily for
private interests.
96 T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 285 (1919) (“[A]ssociations formed to
disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not educational within the meaning of the
statute.”).
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Political activity, partisanship, bias, and non-neutrality often are
equated and generally regarded as serving private interests.97 By
barring all political activity, the Rule removes any discretion
otherwise left to the IRS to determine when private benefit exists.
Thus, the Rule is a prophylactic measure; i.e., Congress felt
comfortable enough to say flat out that certain activity is not
permitted.
In addition, and perhaps most critically, the Rule provides an outer
boundary to the scope of the charitable sector, despite the difficulties
of enforcement. Policing the border of the charitable exemption,98 the
Rule is one of the few bright-lines99 that places a meaningful limit on
the charitable purpose requirement and so constrains the scope of the
charitable tax benefits.100 As discussed in Part IV of this Article,
alternatives to the Rule would mean loss of this border control
function, and so are not appealing, conceptually or administratively.
They would also likely lead to a significant loss of revenue.
In short, fundamentally, the decision about what is and is not
charitable, given a baseline of taxable status and nondeductibility of
contributions to organizations,101 is a revenue decision by Congress. It
is not a metaphysical question about the true meaning of charity, apart
from what Congress (or the courts) thinks it means. Those who
disagree with the policy may dissent, but the decision is considered
policy nonetheless. In providing tax benefits, Congress had some idea
about what constituted a charitable purpose or a charitable
activity102—the details were left to events. And events confirmed and
reaffirmed the initial instinct that charity and political activity, for
purposes of the tax law, were mutually exclusive.

97 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 337 (“[A]llowing political involvement invites misuse of
the section 501(c)(3) form in pursuit of private interests, rather than for the broad public benefit
that the charitable classification is designed to promote.”).
98 See, e.g., Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 27, at 284–85 (explaining that the
Political Activities Prohibition serves a “border control” function, namely, keeping the public
affairs and charitable spheres separate).
99 The others are the lobbying limitation and the taxation of unrelated business income.
I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 511–514 (2006).
100 Rules that provide some constraint to the scope of the charitable tax benefits are
important especially in light of the recent growth of the charitable sector, the relatively openended nature of charitable tax status, and the relative lack of enforcement or enforceable rules.
For a discussion, see Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay,
11 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2011).
101 But see C RIMM & W INER , supra note 27, at 285 (stating that for houses of worship
“[h]istorically . . . the tax exemption is the baseline; [the exemption] was in place for many
decades before the Johnson Amendment added the restraint on political campaign speech”).
102 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 346 (discussing Congress’s attempts to define
“charitable purposes”).
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Of course, just because Congress has answered the question, it
does not follow that the policy should continue in perpetuity.103 In
theory, the idea of charitable organizations taking sides in politics is
attractive. Under a free market of ideas approach to speech, the truth,
or information, will be better served with more speech. The public
will have new perspectives to consider that may be more informative,
educational, and detached than many of the political voices shrieking
the loudest today.
Further, allowing political activity by charities is not a mandate;
charities may remain agnostic and apart from the political process. To
the extent that the consumers of charity do not want charities to
become involved in politics, many, if not most, charities will respond
to this sentiment and remain aloof. It is easy to imagine a charity,
dipping a toe in the political water to endorse a candidate for the first
time, only to hear from angry donors and others that the activity was
inappropriate. A charity’s stakeholders might also accuse the charity
of endorsing the wrong candidate, or argue that the charity should not
even risk endorsing a losing candidate, for fear of jeopardizing the
charity’s standing in the community as an opponent of an elected
official. Just as with for-profit corporations,104 the risk that a charity’s
direct political activity could harm its relationships with its supporters
is likely to be high, and constraining.105 Moreover, in a sector of over
1.5 million organizations,106 not including churches,107 the percentage
103 Debate about the proper relationship between politics and charity is an ongoing one. In
a recent spirited defense of the Rule, Professor Donald Tobin argued that the Rule protects the
independence of section 501(c)(3) organizations, that campaign intervention generally is
inconsistent with an educational or charitable mission, and that campaigning by section
501(c)(3) organizations would harm the democratic process. Tobin, supra note 82, at 1319–20.
By contrast, others believe that free speech and organizational mission would be better served if
charities had a political voice. See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 84, at 1062 (responding to Tobin’s
argument). The debate is an earnest one, and perhaps may fairly be characterized as a policy
struggle between those concerned about the consequences of a partisan and “not so
independent” sector and those embracing a braver world of new political voices informing the
public debate.
104 See Jia Lynn Yang & Dan Eggen, Campaign Spending Puts Target in Bulls-Eye,
WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2010, at A1 (discussing the repercussions of Target’s decision to donate
money to a pro-business group).
105 See, e.g., Frances R. Hill, Corporate Philanthropy and Campaign Finance: Exempt
Organizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 941 (1997) (“To
the extent that particular exempt organizations take positions on particular electoral contests,
they may gain the advantage of intensifying the support of some members and even of attracting
some new members, but they also risk alienating current and potential members and supporters.
For exempt organizations with their own agendas of exempt activity, these risks should be taken
seriously.”).
106 MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40919, AN
OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 3 (2009). This figure does not include
organizations that do not file an exemption application with the IRS, which could number in the
hundreds of thousands (e.g., churches, other qualifying religious organizations, and very small
organizations). Id. Approximately 116,000 of the 1.5 million organizations are private

2/22/2012 5:30:46 PM

706

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3

of those likely to do much more than endorse a candidate is likely to
be small—politics is not really a natural fit for many charities.
So, for the most part,108 a relaxation of the Political Activities
Prohibition should not dramatically change the makeup of the
activities of existing organizations. Charities that already advocate on
issues, a small percentage of the total, are expected to do so by their
supporters and will have more tools to advance their mission. More
traditional charities—hospitals, colleges and universities, social
service organizations, and arts organizations—might abstain from a
new found freedom to engage in politics. Churches may be unique.
Some would likely endorse candidates and take more active electoral
steps. Others would not. Some might regret a foray into politics.
Others might relish it. But the ultimate success or failure of the
project would likely be decided by the parishioners—who can vote
with their feet.
Taking the above thoughts into account, the Rule and its defenders
may come across as paternalistic and overly concerned about what
might happen. The parade of horribles offered—the loss of
independence, the diversion from, and perhaps compromise of,
mission, in effect the corruption of the sector—would be a terrible
outcome. Need it be feared? There should be little dispute that the
admirable and aspirational qualities of charitable organizations are, to
a certain extent, noble ones; a nobility that rises above faction. The
sphere of political campaigns, by contrast, is characterized by
fighting, deceit, and dirty maneuvers—all perhaps in the service of a
public good—but hardly noble qualities. Being in service to ideas,
helping others, advancing culture, and delivering a needed good are
the core expectations that we have of charity. While permitting
involvement in political activities may not necessarily lead to the
corruption of the charitable sector, it would introduce an ignoble
quality to the sector from which the Rule has provided a shield. And,
as discussed in Part IV, it would seriously dilute an already fluid
concept of charity.
Ultimately, whether the Rule should be changed is a question that
should be decided not from fear about what might happen, but rather
by reconsidering the questions Congress already answered in enacting
the Rule: Is political activity charitable? Should it be? It is noteworthy

foundations. Id.
107 See id. at 3 (“Churches and other qualifying religious organizations are exempt from the
annual information-reporting requirements.”).
108 As argued in Part IV, however, change to the Rule likely would bring many new
entrants.
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that we live in a time where distrust of government is high. The
public’s distrust of government could be a product of the intense
partisanship and preeminence of selfish motives that is part of the
political process. Distrust of many of our institutions, public or
private, for-profit or not-for-profit, is also high. Such distrust, many
would argue, is not warranted. But to the extent that the Rule protects
an important part of our society from further distrust, it is a good
thing.
II. DOES CITIZENS UNITED CONDEMN THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
PROHIBITION?
A. Introduction
The reason to question anew the Political Activities Prohibition
stems from the Supreme Court’s recent decision Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission.109 The case concerned a nonprofit
corporation, Citizens United, organized under section 501(c)(4) of the
Code.110 In January 2008, Citizens United released a film called
“Hillary: The Movie,” which was very critical of Hillary Clinton, who
was at the time a senator and a candidate for the presidency.111 The
Court concluded that “there is no reasonable interpretation of Hillary
other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton” and that “the
film qualifies as the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”112
Accordingly, the Court said, section 441b of the Federal Election
Campaign Act (“FECA”),113 as amended, prevented Citizens United
from releasing the film.114 The Court held, however, that the part of
109 130

S. Ct. 876 (2010).
at 936 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to the Court, Citizens United had an
annual budget of about $12 million, and received most of its funds from individuals but also
received some contributions from for-profit corporations. Id. at 887. Because of the corporate
contributions, Citizens United could not qualify for the exception to the rule created in Federal
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986), that
restrictions on corporate expenditures in political campaigns were unconstitutional as applied to
nonprofit corporations “that were formed for the sole purpose of promoting political ideas, did
not engage in business activities, and did not accept contributions from for-profit corporations
or labor unions.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 891. Section 501(c)(4) of the Code describes
“social welfare” organizations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006). It differs from section 501(c)(3) of the
Code in several important respects. See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining the distinctions between
section 501(c)(3) and section 501(c)(4) organizations).
111 130 S. Ct. at 887.
112 Id. at 890.
113 Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)
(2006)).
114 130 S. Ct. at 891. Section 441b(a) provides in part that: “It is unlawful for . . . any
corporation . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any
political office . . . .” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006). Section 441b(b)(2) provides that the term
110 Id.
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section 441b that bars corporations from making independent
expenditures and electioneering communications (the “Electioneering
Rule”) was an unconstitutional burden on Citizens United’s right to
free speech under the First Amendment, and, therefore Citizens
United had a right to release the film.115 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court overruled a prior decision, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce116 in its entirety, and part of McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission.117
Assume that subsequently, in 2012, a corporation called “Our
Country,” recognized as a charity under section 501(c)(3) of the
Code, releases a film called Obama: The Movie. This movie is, in
many respects, a sequel to Hillary but with a different star and bears
no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote against
President Obama in his campaign for re-election. The IRS
investigates the organization, concludes there has been a violation of
the Political Activities Prohibition, and revokes Our Country’s taxexempt status. Our Country appeals, the case reaches the Supreme
Court, and the Court must rule on the constitutionality of the Political
Activities Prohibition. The Court will either distinguish or follow
Citizens United, making careful analysis of the Court’s opinion in
Citizens United critical to understanding the continuing validity of the
Political Activities Prohibition.
The key threshold issue for the Court in Citizens United was
whether the Electioneering Rule was a burden on speech.118 The
Court answered in the affirmative.119 Strict scrutiny of the

“‘contribution or expenditure’ includes a contribution or expenditure . . . for any applicable
electioneering communication.” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).
115 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.
116 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130. S. Ct. at 913.
117 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
118 130 S. Ct. at 892. In general, understanding the structure of the Court’s majority
opinion is useful. The opinion is divided into five parts. Part I provides the factual and
procedural background. Id. at 886–88. Part II explains why the Court undertook a facial
challenge to the statute (instead of an as-applied challenge), and why the Court believed that it
had to decide the constitutional issue directly, i.e., without resorting to circumlocutions of
statutory interpretation. Id. at 888–96. Part III is organized into introductory material, id. at 896–
99, and then four sections, A, B, C, and D. In Part III.A, the Court explained its conclusion that
there are conflicting lines of precedent regarding the constitutionality of the Electioneering
Rule, thus warranting its decision. Id. at 899–903. Part III.B analyzed the three proffered
government interests in the Electioneering Rule—the anti-distortion rationale, corruption and
the appearance of corruption, and shareholder protection—concluding that none is a compelling
state interest. Id. at 903–11. Part III.C discussed the relevance of stare decisis to the Court’s
decision. Id. at 911–13. Part III.D explicitly overruled Austin, as well as a portion of McConnell.
Id. at 913. Part IV related to the disclosure provisions. Id. at 913–16. In Part V, the Court
concluded. Id. at 916–17.
119 Id. at 917.
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Electioneering Rule followed, requiring a compelling state interest in
support of it, which was held not to exist.120 Importantly, in
concluding that the Electioneering Rule was a burden on speech, the
Court considered four factors: (1) the purpose of the Electioneering
Rule to suppress speech; (2) the criminal sanction for violating the
Electioneering Rule; (3) the nature of the rule as a ban on speech; and
(4) the Electioneering Rule’s identification of certain preferred
speakers.121 As discussed below, however, with respect to each of
these factors—purpose, sanction, and a ban on corporate speech—the
Political Activities Prohibition is distinguishable from the
Electioneering Rule and Citizens United. Accordingly, the Court is
not compelled to follow the reasoning of Citizens United in
considering the Political Activities Prohibition, which, as argued
infra, is not a burden on speech in the same sense as the
Electioneering Rule. Therefore, the Political Activities Prohibition
should be subject to a lesser standard of review (and thus probably
survive scrutiny).
B. Purpose of the Rule
1. Purpose of Section 501(c)(3) is to Define Charity for Tax Purposes
There is little room to doubt that the Electioneering Rule of section
441b, including the now unconstitutional ban on corporate
independent expenditures, is a rule “to control or suppress speech.”122
The ban on corporate contributions to political candidates and
campaigns and the ban on corporate independent expenditures are
overt Congressional efforts to regulate speech in the electoral process.
Indeed, the entire apparatus of campaign finance laws and regulations
are intended to regulate core First Amendment speech. Accordingly,
Part III of the Court’s opinion in Citizens United began by quoting the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”123 Then, the Court said that
“[l]aws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at different
points in the speech process.”124 Implicit in this statement is the
120 Id.

at 903–11.
at 896–99. The implications of Citizens United for the Political Activities
Prohibition lie mostly in the introductory material to Part III of the Court’s opinion, in which the
Court provided the decision’s framework, equally applicable to Our Country in the hypothetical
posed above as to Citizens United. See also Galston, supra note 12, at 890–902 (describing the
scrutiny through which the court reviews campaign finance laws).
122 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896.
123 Id. (quoting U.S. C ONST . amend. I).
124 Id.
121 Id.
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Court’s articulation of the purpose of the Electioneering Rule: to
control or suppress speech. The Court later reiterated that the
Electioneering Rule’s “purpose and effect” is “to silence entities
whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”125
By contrast, section 501(c)(3) of the Code has a different purpose.
Notwithstanding that the rationale for section 501(c)(3) has been
debated amid an obscure legislative history,126 the section manifestly
is not about the regulation of speech. It is not a law “enacted to
control or suppress speech.”127 Rather, it is a law enacted to describe a
type of organization that is not subject to federal income tax.
Congress requires a section 501(c)(3) organization128 to meet four
requirements: (1) it must be organized and operated for an exempt
purpose; (2) no earnings of the organization may inure to the benefit
of insiders; (3) there may be no substantial lobbying; and (4) no
political activity is allowed.129 If all four requirements are met on an
ongoing basis, then the organization is a “charity” for tax law
purposes.
The statute’s structure is important because it shows that the
Political Activities Prohibition is definitional. Quite simply, an
organization is not a charity under section 501(c)(3) if it engages in
political activity. This matters because there is an ongoing fault-line
between “charity” for tax law purposes and “charity” viewed more
normatively and apart from the tax law. Often, commentators describe
charity in the normative, aspirational sense and the Political Activities
125 Id.

at 898.
Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 590 n.23 (1998) (explaining the several theories behind
charitable exemptions but highlighting the lack of legislative expression regarding tax benefits
for charities); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 430–39 (1998)
(exploring several theories of charitable tax exemption).
127 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896. The cases the Citizens United Court cited for
examples of unconstitutional laws that suppress speech are all qualitatively different from
section 501(c)(3). See id. at 896–97 (citing Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v.
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–66 (2002) (striking down a village ordinance regulating
door-to-door canvassing on First Amendment grounds as applied to religious proselytizing,
anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (finding a state financial
regulation inconsistent with the First Amendment because it placed a content-based financial
burden on speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (per curiam) (finding that
the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the First Amendment because it failed to
distinguish mere advocacy and abstract teaching from incitement to imminent lawless action);
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (reversing judgment awarded in a civil
libel action as inconsistent with First Amendment principles of freedom of speech and of the
press because statements critical of public officials in their official conduct are protected)).
128 A section 501(c)(3) organization can take the form of a corporation, community chest,
fund, or foundation. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
129 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
126 See
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Prohibition as if it were external to charity, properly defined, viewing
charity independently of the Rule.130 This is in many respects the
principal tension underlying charitable exemption: organizations may
view section 501(c)(3) status as an entitlement, and any conditions
imposed for such status as anathema.
For example, Professor Chisolm described the Political Activities
Prohibition as “an unavoidable choice: either exercise its right to free
political expression and forfeit the benefit of tax exemption to which
its charitable character otherwise entitles it, or claim its entitlement
and forgo the right.”131 But note that, because the Political Activities
Prohibition is definitional, an organization that engages in political
activity does not have a “charitable character,” at least not under the
tax law. This illustrates the normative versus the tax law definition of
charity. Professor Chisolm argued more from the normative side—
whether charity should be defined as exclusive of political activity for
tax law purposes. Thus, in her analysis of the Rule’s rationale, she
said that the reason for the Rule could have stemmed from
“definitional consistency.”132 That is, Congress decided that the tax
law definition of charity should conform to its understanding of a
common law definition. Nevertheless, although definitional
consistency may explain Congress’s decision, the point is that
Congress did not have to define charity as it did, or in accord with any
common law or other norm. What matters is that Congress did decide
to define charity to include the Political Activities Prohibition, and
not whether charity in a normative sense should include such a rule.
Further, the purpose of the definition was not to suppress speech.
As discussed above, there are many reasons supporting a prohibition
on political activities as part of the definition of a tax-exempt charity:
(1) Congress wants charities to focus on core charitable activity; (2)
Congress wants a charitable sector untainted by partisan flavor; (3)
Congress does not want to subsidize political activity through
exemption; (4) Congress wants to protect charities from political
capture; and (5) Congress does not think political activity is charitable
activity.133 In short, Congress decided to define charity to exclude
political activity (and private inurement, and substantial lobbying). In
so doing, Congress was trying to promote something, charity, by
130 See, e.g., Joseph S. Klapach, Note, Thou Shalt Not Politic: A Principled Approach to
Section 501(c)(3)’s Prohibition of Political Campaign Activity, 84 C ORNELL L. R EV. 504, 506
(describing a charity as having to do a “deal with the IRS” under which “the charity must
sacrifice its ‘soul’”).
131 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 332.
132 Id. at 344.
133 See supra Part I.C (discussing the justifications for and criticisms of the Rule).

2/22/2012 5:30:46 PM

712

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3

excluding certain activities. The Rule is not primarily about
suppressing speech.
Similarly, section 170(c) of the Code is a law enacted to describe
the type of organization with respect to which charitable—and so
deductible—contributions may be made.134 It too is not a law
“enacted to control or suppress speech.”135 Both sections of the Code
directly implicate speech, to be sure, but their overriding purpose is
not to regulate speech.
2. Purpose of the Rule Viewed as Part of the Tax-Exemption System
In addition, to decide whether the Political Activities Prohibition
of section 501(c)(3) is a law with a purpose of suppressing speech,
and thus is a First Amendment case, or is a law with a revenue
purpose, and thus a tax case that touches on speech, it is instructive to
consider other sections of the Code pertaining to federal income tax
exemption. Just as section 441b’s purpose is understood in light of the
purpose of the FECA to regulate elections, similarly, the purpose of
tax exemption and its relationship to partisan activity is better
understood by viewing the entire statutory scheme. As the Supreme
Court said in the related context of the lobbying limitation of section
501(c)(3): “it is necessary to understand the effect of the taxexemption system enacted by Congress.”136
Importantly, the “tax-exemption system” covers many types of
organizations, not just section 501(c)(3) organizations. The law of
tax-exempt organizations describes at least twenty-nine types of
organizations.137 Each type may qualify for a tax treatment that is
other than the default treatment for the organization. For example, if
an organization incorporates, then as a general matter, it is subject to
tax as a corporation under subchapter C of the Code, unless it can and
does elect to be treated differently, or it qualifies for different
treatment under one of the exempt organization provisions. Notably,
no tax-related political activities prohibition applies to the default
treatment of the corporation as a corporation.138 Instead, limitations
134 I.R.C.

§ 170(c) (2006).
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010).
136 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (emphasis
added).
137 Section 501(a) of the Code provides exemption from federal income tax to
organizations described in section 501(c) or (d) and section 401. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006). There
are more than 29 types of organizations described in section 501(c) and (d), of which section
501(c)(3) organizations are but one type. I.R.C. § 501(c)–(d). Section 401 of the Code describes
various types of pension plans. I.R.C. § 401.
138 The Electioneering Rule was imposed upon the corporation as a corporation. See infra
text accompanying notes 188–90 (explaining that the Electioneering Rule is an entity level rule
135 Citizens

2/22/2012 5:30:46 PM

2012]

THE POLITICAL SPEECH OF CHARITIES

713

on political activities are a result of a choice of other than the default
tax treatment.
Of the many exempt organization types, only one—the section
501(c)(3) organization—is subject to a prohibition on political
activities.139 Other tax-exempt entities may and do participate in
political activity. For example, the social welfare organization
described in section 501(c)(4) of the Code is permitted to engage in
political activity so long as the activity does not become its principal
activity.140 In general, this same conceptual approach to political
activity applies to other exempt organizations—i.e., absent a
prohibition, the activity generally is permitted. Accordingly, for
exempt organizations other than section 501(c)(3) organizations, the
question of political activity concerns the extent to which political
activity may become inconsistent with the organization’s exemption
type so as to change the nature of the organization and disqualify it
from its otherwise applicable tax status.
If an organization crosses a line so that its primary purpose is to
influence elections, the “tax exemption system” of the Code has an
answer: section 527. Section 527 provides for the tax treatment of
political organizations, i.e., an organization that is organized and
operated primarily for partisan activity.141 Political organizations are
defined based entirely on the purpose of the organization (irrespective
of organizational form), and the tax treatment follows the
definition.142 Further, Congress was aware that some exempt
organizations might engage in partisan activity but fall short of
political organization status. Thus, if an exempt organization
(meaning here any of the 29 organization types listed in section

unlike the Political Activities Prohibition).
139 In general, this means that the activities of a political organization and a charitable
organization are mutually exclusive. See supra Part I.C. But at least one activity—attempting to
influence the confirmation of judicial appointments—qualifies as a political activity for
purposes of section 527 but not as political activity for purposes of section 501(c)(3). I.R.S.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39694 (Feb. 22, 1988).
140 Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981–1 C.B. 332; Rev. Rul. 67–368, 1967–2 C.B. 194.
141 I.R.C. § 527 (2006).
142 I.R.C. § 527(a), (e)(1). Although political organizations are often referred to as
“exempt” organizations, this is mostly a misnomer, due in part to the location of the political
organization provisions in the Code in the 500 series and to the terminology of the section—
referring to “exempt function” and “exempt function income.” Section 527 organizations are
best viewed as a distinct type of organization for tax purposes, with a special set of tax rules.
See generally Roger Colinvaux, Regulation of Political Organizations and the Red Herring of
Tax Exempt Status, 59 NAT’L. TAX J. 531 (2006) (describing the tax treatment of section 527
organizations).
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501(c)) spends money on partisan activity, the organization is subject
to the tax rules of section 527.143
In sum, to a certain extent, with respect to political activity, the
“tax exemption system” can be viewed as covering a spectrum of
organizations. Section 501(c)(3) organizations, which participate in
no political activity, are on one extreme. And section 527
organizations are on the other, participating in unlimited political
activity as a primary purpose. Other exempt organizations, which can
participate in political activity to the extent that the activity does not
subsume the organization, are somewhere in between.
The presence of such an elaborate, if somewhat ad hoc, system
sheds light on the purpose of limits on political activity for tax
purposes. Beginning with the default, taxable status, there are no tax
restrictions on political activity. But if an organization claims an
exemption, limitations follow. The limits can be severe or moderate
depending upon the nature of the exempt status claimed. The
important point, however, is that political activity, and expenses for
and income from partisan speech, is and always has been a special
subject for the tax law. As an activity, it is neither promoted nor
suppressed. The restrictions arise as incidental to the aim of
exemption. That is, some other activity (the exempt activity) might be
promoted relative to political activity, but suppression of political
activity as such is not the goal. Where political activity is relevant, the
concerns are whether the activity is consistent with the organization’s
tax status, the extent to which it is consistent, and the appropriate tax
treatment for a completely partisan organization. The only exempt
organization facing a prohibition is the section 501(c)(3) organization.
This can be explained not only because of special concerns about the
politicization of charity, but also because of other tax benefits related
to charities—generally unavailable to other exempt organizations—
such as the charitable deduction.144
In short, not all entities are treated alike for tax purposes. To the
extent the tax law has made distinctions based on political activity, it
is not limited to section 501(c)(3) organizations, but covers many
others. Arguably, in no case has the purpose of the tax classification
and political activity rules been based on a desire to suppress speech.
Importantly, to the extent Citizens United calls into question the
validity of the Political Activities Prohibition, the impact will be
143 See I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (providing generally for tax on the lesser of a section 501(c)
organization’s investment income or the amount spent on political activity).
144 I.R.C. § 170(a). See also Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by
Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85 (1993) (describing the benefits accorded to
nonprofit organizations).
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much broader, really calling into question the basic decision made by
Congress that a partisan activity is significant for tax purposes.145
3. Purpose and Institutional Considerations
In addition, the respective purposes of the Electioneering Rule and
the Political Activities Prohibition play an important role as a
background consideration in comparing Citizens United and the
hypothetical Our Country posed above in Part II.A. Laws with the
purpose of regulating speech are likely to be strongly shaped by the
Supreme Court, but laws directed to tax classifications may receive
greater deference.
Thus, because the purpose of the campaign finance law is to
regulate speech, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has
developed a rich, detailed, complex, and varied jurisprudence in the
campaign finance arena. Over the twenty-four year period from the
landmark case Buckley v. Valeo146 to Citizen’s United, there have
been no fewer than seventeen Supreme Court opinions on the
constitutionality of the campaign finance laws.147 Indeed, it is fair to
145 See supra Part I.A (explaining the reasoning behind Congress’s determination that
partisan activity is significant for tax purposes).
146 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
147 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (ruling that restrictions on
corporate spending on election campaign ads that advocate based on issues are subject to strict
scrutiny and are unconstitutional); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (holding that
Vermont’s campaign finance statute violated the First Amendment because it restricted the
amounts candidates could spend on their campaigns and restricted the amounts that individuals,
organizations, and political parties could contribute to those campaigns); McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93 (2003) (holding that most soft money provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act did not violate free speech and association rights), overruled in part by Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (ruling that
prohibiting nonprofit advocacy corporations to make direct contributions to federal elections is
consistent with the First Amendment); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533
U.S. 431 (2001) (holding that limits on coordinated expenditures of the Federal Election
Campaign Act are constitutional as they are not an undue burden); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t
PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding Missouri’s campaign finance law limiting contributions
to state political candidates); Col. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604
(1996) (finding that independent political expenditures by political parties do not violate the
Federal Election Campaign Act’s restrictions); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding a restriction on corporate treasury funding of state candidate
elections), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that defendant’s violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act
was trumped by its First Amendment rights and therefore the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to defendant); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985)
(holding that the provision of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act limiting
expenditures by political parties was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment);
FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (determining who is a member for
purposes of the Federal Election Campaign Act); Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (holding that the disclosure requirement of an Ohio campaign law
was unconstitutional when applied to a minor political party); Bread Political Action Comm. v.
FEC, 455 U.S. 577 (1982) (denying expedited review of the Federal Election Campaign Act to
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say that the Supreme Court’s constant presence in the campaign
finance area has made it a key institutional actor with a vested interest
in shaping these laws through its jurisprudence. Since Buckley, the
political battles and constitutional questions have been almost
ceaseless. Dissenting justices have consistently voiced their opinion
that Buckley was wrongly decided.148 And it has been common to
speculate whether the next case will bring a major shift in the
constitutionality of prevailing campaign finance rules.149 Despite its
high controversy—including accusations that the Court decided a
question not properly raised,150 and overturned decades of precedent
with barely a nod to the importance of stare decisis151—Citizens
United was not entirely a surprise. The Court has sent signals for
years, either through the complexity of its own rulings or through the
voices of individual justices, that all was not well with the
congressional (and the Federal Election Commission’s) approach to
the regulation of campaign finance.152
By contrast, the purpose of sections 501(c)(3) and 170 is to
provide an exemption and a deduction, i.e., to describe organizations

group not listed as eligible in the statute); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290 (1981) (holding that a limit in an ordinance on the right of association was
unconstitutional); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981)
(holding that the Federal Election Campaign Act does not foreclose the use of agency
agreements); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of
contribution limits against First and Fifth Amendment challenges); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (declaring a state criminal statute that denied corporations the
right to make political contributions unconstitutional).
148 See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“I
continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo . . . was wrongly decided . . . .”); Nat’l Conservative
PAC, 470 U.S. at 507 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“I continue to believe that
Buckley v. Valeo . . . was wrongly decided.”).
149 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Set to Weigh Central Election-Law Issues,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at A14 (speculating about the upcoming 2006 Supreme Court
decision in Randall v. Sorrell, wherein a Vermont campaign finance law was challenged);
Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Neil A. Lewis, Campaign Law Set for Big Test In a Courtroom, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at A1 (discussing the upcoming 2003 Supreme Court decision in
McConnell v. FEC, which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold
Act).
150 Adam Liptak, Justices Turn Minor Movie Case Into a Blockbuster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2010, at A13 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 932 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“‘Essentially,’ Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the dissenters in the 5–to–4
decision, ‘five justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they
changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.’”).
151 Adam Liptak, Stevens Era, Nearing End, Takes On An Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2010, at A12 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 942 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“In his
dissent, Justice Stevens said no principle required overruling two major campaign finance
precedents. ‘The only relevant thing that has changed since’ those decisions, he wrote, ‘is the
composition of this court.’”).
152 See supra notes 148 and accompanying text (discussing skepticism amongst some
justices that Buckley v. Valeo was wrongly decided).
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and expenses that for purposes of the tax system are treated
differently than others. It should come as no surprise that the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is much less varied, complex, and
voluminous in this area. Here, we are not speaking of the Court’s role
in exercising judicial review of the Constitution, but rather of
Congress’s role in raising revenue, and the extent to which the means
chosen by Congress implicate constitutional concerns.153
Accordingly, tax cases challenging deductions and exemptions
generally must overcome the Court’s deferential posture: deductions
are a matter of legislative grace.154
More specifically, Supreme Court cases involving section
501(c)(3) (or its predecessors) are few and far between. The two most
relevant cases, Cammarano v. United States155 and Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Washington (“TWR”),156 are unanimous
decisions157 that largely and summarily affirm Congress’s decision to
place limitations on speech in connection with a deduction or an
exemption. A third case, Speiser v. Randall,158 also is summary by
today’s standards, but this time in the opposite direction: striking
down a state exemption because of its implications on free speech.159
Speiser, however, as discussed below, is readily distinguishable from
the Cammarano and TWR approach.160
In any event, the sparsity of cases places any challenge to the
Political Activities Prohibition in a much different political and legal
context. Unlike the campaign finance area, in tax cases generally, and
section 501(c)(3) cases in particular, the Court does not have a rich
history or institutional voice.161 In short, the Court is not defending its
153 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)
(referring to the lobbying limitation as a decision by Congress not to subsidize the activity, the
Court concluded, “[w]e have no doubt but that this statute is within Congress’ broad power in
this area”); see also Galston, supra note 12, at 891–97 (discussing the Court’s deferential tax
law approach).
154 E.g., Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958) (“Deductions are a matter of grace
and Congress can, of course, disallow them as it chooses.”); Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm’r,
319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943) (“[W]e examine the argument in the light of the now familiar rule that
an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing
the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.”); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292
U.S. 435, 440 (1934) (“Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon
legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be
allowed.”).
155 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
156 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
157 There were concurrences in both cases, discussed infra at text accompanying notes
179–80 and 245–47.
158 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
159 Id. at 529.
160 See infra Part II.F.1–2.
161 The canon of Supreme Court cases concerning the charitable tax benefits of the Code
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own turf to the extent it is in the campaign finance arena. Although in
Citizens United the Court showed a willingness to overturn settled
law, they did so in an area of law—campaign finance—that
undergoes constant legislative change and constitutional scrutiny, and
arguably, was never all that settled. Further, the Court said that they
were in effect forced into a controversial decision in order to resolve a
split in their own precedents.162 Accordingly, it may be a much
different matter institutionally to overturn a rule such as the Political
Activities Prohibition—the context is completely different,
notwithstanding the facial similarities to the impact on speech.
C. Sanctions
In deciding whether the Electioneering Rule was a burden on
speech, the Court in Citizens United described certain actions that, if
taken, would be subject to the Electioneering Rule:
(1) The Sierra Club runs an ad within 60 days of a general
election that tells the public to disapprove of a Congressman
who supports logging in national forests;
(2) The National Rifle Association publishes a book urging
the public to vote against an incumbent Senator who supports
a handgun ban; and
(3) The American Civil Liberties Union creates a website
endorsing a presidential candidate on free speech grounds.163
Those examples, designed assuredly to highlight the outcome of the
Electioneering Rule as censorship of the first order, are each also

are fairly sparse and wide ranging. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
585 (1983) (holding that non-profit private schools that use religious doctrine to racially
discriminate cannot qualify as a tax-exempt organization); TWR, 461 U.S. at 551 (granting
substantial latitude to Congress for determining which groups can receive tax-exempt status);
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970) (affirming New York statute
permitting tax exempt status for religious organizations); Better Bus. Bureau of D.C., Inc. v.
United States, 326 U.S. 279, 286 (1945) (refusing a tax exemption for an organization that
primarily conducted business); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 582
(1924) (affirming tax exempt status of an organization that directed profits towards science and
education).
162 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010) (“The Court is thus confronted with
conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based
on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”). But see id. at 938
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There was also the straightforward path: applying Austin and
McConnell, just as the District Court did in holding that the funding of Citizens United’s film
can be regulated under them. The only thing preventing the majority from affirming the District
Court, or adopting a narrower ground that would retain Austin, is its disdain for Austin.”).
163 Id. at 897.
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likely to violate the Political Activities Prohibition if undertaken by
charities. At first glance then, how can the Rule survive?
The facial similarities between the Electioneering Rule and the
Political Activities Prohibition diverge not just with respect to
purpose but also when the consequences of violating either rule are
taken into account. That the Electioneering Rule is overtly “backed by
criminal sanctions” was clearly important to the Court.164 The above
examples, the Court said, “would all be felonies.”165 And although the
opinion asserted the importance of protecting the speech of
corporations qua corporations, the corporation qua corporation does
not go to jail for corporate violations. Rather, only natural persons,
i.e., those who knowingly and willfully violate the Electioneering
Rule, can go to jail.
That the criminal sanction is important to the Court was evidenced
by the repeated references to felonies or crimes throughout the
Court’s opinion—appearing in each part except Part IV166 (the
omission in Part IV is to be expected because Part IV upheld the
constitutionality of the disclosure provisions). Indeed, the Court
concluded in Part V that “it seems stranger than fiction for our
Government to make this political speech a crime. Yet this is the
statute’s purpose and design.”167 In other words, the criminalization of
speech is a critical part of the campaign finance statutory and
regulatory scheme and an important factor in the Court’s decision.
As such, the Electioneering Rule’s sanction is an important basis
for distinction with the Political Activities Prohibition. The
prohibition often is referred to, somewhat redundantly, as
164 Id.
165 Id. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A) (2006) (“Any person who knowingly and willfully
commits a violation of any provision of this Act which involves the making, receiving, or
reporting of any contribution, donation or expenditure” shall be fined or imprisoned or both.).
166 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888 (noting that Citizens United “feared” that Hillary
involved independent expenditures “thus subjecting the corporation to civil and criminal
penalties”); id. at 889 (dismissing the ACLU’s argument as amici regarding how to interpret the
electioneering communication definition in part because an inaccurate determination under their
definition would “potentially subject[] the speaker to criminal sanctions”); id. at 895 (“[A]
speaker who wants to avoid threats of criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against
FEC enforcement must ask a governmental agency for prior permission to speak.”); id. at 897
(“The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions.”); id. at 897 (noting that
“[s]ection 441b makes it a felony for all corporations—including nonprofit advocacy
corporations” to engage in political speech); id. at 897 (giving examples of what would be a
felony under section 441b); id. at 903 (noting that a violation of the Michigan law at issue in
Austin “was punishable as a felony”); id. at 904 (“If the First Amendment has any force, it
prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply
engaging in political speech.”); id. at 908 (“When Government seeks to use its full power,
including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or what
distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought.”).
167 Id. at 917.
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“absolute,”168 meaning that a single instance of political activity
violates the Rule. Violation is not, however, a felony. Rather, the
consequence for violation is revocation of the organization’s
charitable status.169 The organization also is barred from reorganizing
as a tax-exempt social welfare organization under section 501(c)(4) of
the Code.170
In addition to revocation, if expenditures are involved in the
political activity, excise taxes may be assessed.171 There is an excise
tax on the organization equal to 10 percent of the expenditure (100
percent if not corrected in a certain amount of time), and an excise tax
on an organization manager equal to 2.5 percent of the expenditure
(50 percent if the manager refused to agree to part or all of the
correction) if the manager knowingly agreed to make the
expenditure.172 Flagrant violations of the Rule may result in expedited
enforcement action.173
In short, the difference in consequence between the Electioneering
Rule and the Political Activities Prohibition are significant. One
168 See Kindell & Reilly, supra note 40, at 352 (discussing Seventh and Second Circuit
cases holding the prohibition to be absolute and noting that an organization violates it even if
political participation is not a “substantial part” of the group’s overall activities). The reason for
the redundancy is that words, especially in statutes, often do not mean what they seem to say.
For example, section 501(c)(3) organizations must be “exclusively” organized and operated for
exempt purposes. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). But “exclusively” turns out to mean “primarily” in
the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1 (as amended in 2008). This illustrates the need for
emphasis when describing the Political Activities Prohibition as absolute—the statute really
does mean what it says. Of course, this turns out not to be entirely correct either, as the recent
IRS reports on enforcement of the Political Activities Prohibition demonstrate. See also IRS,
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3–4 (2006) (reporting
violations of the prohibition but no sanction).
169 See IRS, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
(2006) (indicating that sanctions for violating the prohibition are limited to fines and
revocation).
170 I.R.C. § 504(a). The inability to reorganize as a section 501(c)(4) organization does not
apply to churches. Id. at § 504(c). The court in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137,
142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cited this factor as part of its reasoning that the sanction, at least with
respect to churches, was not especially onerous.
171 I.R.C. § 4955. The text of section 4955 suggests that the excise tax is not an
intermediate sanction, but rather is to be levied in addition to revocation of charitable status. The
legislative history, however, sends mixed signals—it states that the sanction is not intended to
weaken the absolute character of the prohibition, but also indicates that in certain limited cases,
the IRS may have the discretion to use the excise tax in lieu of revocation. H.R. Rep. No. 100–
391, pt. 2, at 1624 (1987).
172 I.R.C. § 4955.
173 See I.R.C. § 6852(a) (providing that if a section 501(c)(3) organization flagrantly
violates the prohibition against political expenditures, “the Secretary shall immediately make a
determination of any income tax payable by such organization . . . and shall immediately make a
determination of any tax payable under section 4955 by such organization”); I.R.C. § 7409
(providing that if a section 501(c)(3) organization violates the prohibition on political
expenditures and meets certain requirements, a civil action can be commenced to enjoin it from
making any further expenditures).
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makes speech a crime while the other makes speech a disqualification
for an organization-level tax exemption and possibly exposes the
organization and its managers to monetary penalties if expenditures
are involved. Measured as a form of suppression, the Electioneering
Rule’s direct threat of criminal sanctions likely suppresses the speech
of many, in accordance with its design, while the threat of loss of tax
exemption, though important, is of a different order.
D. A Ban on Speech
A third factor important to the Citizens United Court was its
characterization of the Electioneering Rule as a ban on speech. The
Court said that the Electioneering Rule is a ban “notwithstanding the
fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak.”174 The Court
noted that a “PAC is a separate association from the corporation.”175
Therefore, the Court said, the availability of the option to speak
through a PAC does not allow the corporation to speak.176 Setting
aside the implications of the assertion that a PAC is a separate
association, the point the Court made is quite clear and dovetails with
its concern that corporations as corporations are worthy of protection.
In effect, what the Court was saying is that speech of the
corporation’s PAC is not the same as speech by the corporation, and
therefore, the ban is a ban.
The Citizens United Court’s conclusion that the Electioneering
Rule was a “ban on speech,”177 despite the availability of a PACspeech option, appears to have rather ominous implications for the
Political Activities Prohibition and other tax rules limiting the
lobbying and political activity of charities and other exempt
organizations. Since the Court’s 1983 decision in TWR, it has been
174 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010). “PAC” is short for political action
committee.
175 Id. (emphasis added).
176 Id. And even if it did, the Court said that the formation of a PAC is a burdensome
alternative as “they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.” Id. The
Court cited the fact that “every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer
promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations, preserve
receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this information
within 10 days” in addition to filing detailed monthly reports with the FEC and that “PACs have
to comply with these regulations just to speak.” Id. It is hard to know what to make of the
Court’s burden argument in an exempt organization context. The reporting obligations of
section 527 organizations that are not political committees, and so not subject to FEC rules,
mirror the FEC requirements. I.R.C. § 527(j) (2006). A political organization too must comply
with very similar regulations “just to speak.” The implication is that record-keeping and
ongoing reporting rules may be unconstitutional. But this part of the Court’s opinion appears to
be dicta, as the Court merely adds the burden argument after it already has concluded that the
PAC option is not a sufficient alternative. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897.
177 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
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commonly understood that segregating speech by use of a PAC or an
affiliated organization was an important means to inoculate a rule
affecting speech from a constitutional challenge. Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion in TWR referred to such an alternate channel
approvingly.178 Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in TWR (joined by
two other Justices) was based on the availability of the affiliate
structure, and the fact that the IRS did not require more than separate
incorporation and minimal record keeping to ensure that taxdeductible contributions were not used for lobbying.179 Indeed, the
one court to consider (and uphold) the constitutionality of the
Political Activities Prohibition cited TWR, concluding that a section
501(c)(3) organization had a suitable alternate channel for political
activity because a section 501(c)(3) organization could set up an
affiliated section 501(c)(4) organization, which in turn could establish
a related PAC or political organization to conduct political activity.180
Of course, the section 501(c)(3) organization must take steps to
ensure that the political activities of the PAC are not attributable to
the section 501(c)(3) organization.
Thus, the Court’s statement in Citizens United that a PAC is a
separate association insufficient to speak for the corporation is hard to
square with the Court’s statements about alternate channels in the tax
context. Indeed, directly applying the Court’s statements to the tax
context seems to go against separate incorporation as a panacea.
Rather, it seems to require that the speech of any separate but related
organization be attributable to the original organization.
One possibility is that the Court’s thinking on alternate channels in
the tax context has quite simply changed. If so, however, it does not
necessarily follow that the Political Activities Prohibition (and for
that matter the lobbying limitation) is suddenly unconstitutional. The
presence of a sufficient alternate channel seems to be part of the
constitutional analysis.181 But the extent to which an alternate channel
for speech was necessary given Congress’s broad power to make
subsidy decisions has never been clear.182
178 461

U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
180 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
181 See Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 100, 113–17 (2007) (noting that in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984),
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), and several district and appellate court cases, the
existence of an alternate channel for lobbying is seen as important to the reasoning of TWR).
182 Professor Galston explained that subsequent courts have pointed to an alternate channel
analysis. Id. But the presence or absence of an alternate channel seems more like a factor to be
considered when analyzing whether a rule burdens speech than a rule of constitutional law.
Perhaps the most important point here is that the majority opinion in TWR noted but did not
emphasize the alternate channel. 461 U.S. at 544.
179 Id.
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Further, the Court’s statement regarding the insufficiency of PACs
is perhaps best viewed in connection with the nature of the
Electioneering Rule as a ban on corporate-level speech. Under such a
rule, the corporation as corporation was simply prevented (under
threat of criminal sanction) from speaking. But it is different for
section 501(c)(3) organizations. The Political Activities Prohibition
does not prevent the organization from speaking as such (that is, the
prohibition is not an entity-level rule); rather it prevents the
organization from speaking as a section 501(c)(3) organization.
This is not just a matter of semantics. The distinction between an
entity-level rule and a tax classification-level rule may be significant
for the alternate channel analysis under the First Amendment. In the
tax context, the “organization” can be viewed more broadly than the
tax classification, that is, the several tax-exemption provisions work
as a whole to provide for organization or entity-level speech for tax
purposes.183 The question is whether there is some way for the
organization to speak, if not as a section 501(c)(3) organization, then
as something else like a social welfare organization or a PAC.184
Thus, a section 501(c)(3) should not be viewed in isolation but in
connection with other tax-exemption provisions.185 Under the
Electioneering Rule, there was no similar alternate structure available,
because the ban was an organization-level ban. In other words, the
Court in the past has not, and even in the future might not, view a
PAC or a social welfare organization as “separate” for purposes of an
alternate channel analysis in the tax-exempt organization context.
E. Identity Discrimination
Citizens United is notable for its elevation of the corporate form as
worthy of virtually the same First Amendment protection as
individuals. The Court said:
[T]he Government may commit a constitutional wrong when
by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the
right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and
183 See, e.g., Galston, supra note 181, at 103 (discussing, throughout the article, a
“network” approach to political activity by tax-exempt organizations).
184 See infra Part III for additional discussion of the sufficiency of the alternate channel
with respect to political activities.
185 See also supra Part II.B.2 (arguing the the tax-exemption system as a whole must be
taken into account in determining the purpose of section 501(c)(3) and the Political Activities
Prohibition).
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respect for the speaker’s voice. The Government may not by
these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to
determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.186
The Court concluded that corporations, as corporations, have a
viewpoint and a right to speak.187 Thus, the Electioneering Rule
wrongfully singled out the corporation for speech suppression.
Once again, on its face, the tenor of the Court’s words strongly
suggest that the Political Activities Prohibition is problematic. If
Congress shall make no law singling out certain groups to suppress
their speech, then surely, in adding the Political Activities Prohibition
to section 501(c)(3) in 1954, Congress targeted section 501(c)(3)
organizations for speech suppression just as surely as the
Electioneering Rule singled out corporations and barred their speech.
Yet it is not so straightforward. As a ban on corporate speech, the
Electioneering Rule applies at the entity level.188 The corporate form
is generic and a creature of state law. Corporations can and do have
many purposes and functions. The corporate form is an archetype of
essential legal forms and is considered a “person” for many
purposes.189 In short, the corporation is a foundational category of the
legal system. Whether or not one agrees that corporations should have
the same speech rights as natural persons, it seems indisputable that
the corporate form organizationally is fundamental and that a rule
targeting the speech of a corporation is directed at a core identity of
the legal system.
By contrast, section 501(c)(3)190 is a creature of federal tax law—a
tax classification191—and not an organizational form. The purposes of
a section 501(c)(3) organization are not generic but limited. Because
so many organizations take advantage of the tax classification, there
are of course many section 501(c)(3) organizations,192 and section
186 Citizens

United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
at 913.
188 See supra Part II.D (discussing the entity speech prohibition of the Electioneering
Rule).
189 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and
include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”).
190 Section 501(c)(3) applies to “[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or
foundation.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
191 As a general rule, Congress’ tax classifications enjoy a ‘“presumption of
constitutionality’” that ‘“can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a
classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes.’”
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) (quoting Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)).
192 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (noting that there are more than 1.5 million
187 Id.
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501(c)(3) organizations certainly form an important part of the
economy and society. But the widespread use of section 501(c)(3)
does not change its character as a tax classification. As such, the
Political Activities Prohibition does not target the speech of section
501(c)(3) organizations as organizations as did the Electioneering
Rule. Rather, the Political Activities Prohibition is a condition to
receive a particular tax status, not a prohibition directed to the
organization per se.193 Thus, importantly, although section 501(c)(3)
status formally does not survive political speech, the entity retains its
identity as a corporation (assuming it was so organized) and may
speak. In short, the Political Activities Prohibition is best viewed as a
condition of a tax classification and not an identity-based restriction,
at least not in the same sense of the Electioneering Rule. Concluding
otherwise would extend the Court’s concern about identity-based
bans on speech beyond the entity level to cover other, arguably lesser,
identities such as tax classifications. In other words, if a tax
classification has the same First Amendment standing as the more
generic legal concept of a corporation, it is not clear where the
identity line stops, making speech-based, and perhaps other,
distinctions because of tax status problematic.
F. Existing Jurisprudence Supports the Political Activities
Prohibition
On the surface there is language in Citizens United that suggests
existential (neigh constitutional) peril for the Political Activities
Prohibition. At one point, the Court said bluntly: “No sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”194 Facially, there appears to be
no contest: a charity typically is a nonprofit corporation and the
Political Activities Prohibition is a limit on political speech and
therefore, the prohibition is unconstitutional. But, as argued above,
such a conclusion is too quick.

registered charities, excluding churches).
193 It is an interesting question whether a state, in response to Citizens United, could amend
its corporate code to impose an independent expenditure prohibition as a condition of corporate
existence (presumably on a going forward basis). Even though states may be unlikely to do this,
such a prohibition would still seem to run afoul of Citizens United. Unlike a condition on a tax
classification, violation of such a condition would terminate the corporate existence altogether,
which, given the Court’s support for the corporate legal form per se, would likely be an
unconstitutional result.
194 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
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Purpose, sanction, and a ban on corporate speech are the factors
that moved the Court in Citizens United to conclude that the
Electioneering Rule was a burden on speech and therefore that strict
scrutiny applied.195 With respect to each factor, the hypothetical Our
Country and the Political Activities Prohibition is distinguishable
from Citizens United and the Electioneering Rule.196 The purpose of
the Political Activities Prohibition is not to suppress speech, but to
define charity; the legal setting is tax and not campaign finance;
violation of the Political Activities Prohibition is not criminal; the
Political Activities Prohibition is by nature a rule associated with a
tax status (with, or without, a sufficient alternate channel) rather than
a ban on corporate speech. These comparisons form the funnel
through which the initial and most important conclusion will be
made: Is the Political Activities Prohibition a burden on speech? As
shown above, on each factor, Citizens United is distinguishable from
Our Country.197
Furthermore, the Court would not decide Our Country in a legal
vacuum. The Court previously has concluded, twice, in Cammarano
and TWR, that a restriction that affects speech in connection with a
tax benefit does not burden speech.198 The Court, however, also
concluded the opposite in Speiser.199 Accordingly, even though
plausible arguments can be made distinguishing Our Country from
Citizens United, Our Country must be positioned within existing
Supreme Court jurisprudence of Speiser, Cammarano, and TWR.
1. The Rules of Speiser, Cammarano, and TWR.
Chronologically, Speiser is the first of the decisions, and the
outlier. At issue was a provision of the California constitution, which
provided a property tax exemption to veterans.200 In order to claim the
exemption, veterans were required to complete a standard application
form which included the following oath: “I do not advocate the
overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of
195 See

supra text accompanying note 121.
supra Parts II.B–D.
197 See supra Parts II.B–D.
198 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (“Congress
has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity.
Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”); Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (“Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they
engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those
activities entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is
required to do under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.”).
199 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (“To deny an exemption to claimants who
engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.”).
200 Id. at 514–15.
196 See
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California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate
the support of a foreign government against the United States in event
of hostilities.”201 The Court acknowledged that “[i]t is settled that
speech can be effectively limited by the exercise of the taxing power”
but held that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engaged in
certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such
speech.”202 Additionally, the Court said that “the denial of a tax
exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the
effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech.
The denial is ‘frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas.’”203 Accordingly, the Court held that the loyalty oath was an
unconstitutional condition of a tax exemption.204
By contrast, one year later, in Cammarano, the Court considered
the validity of a Treasury Regulation (now codified in section 162(e)
of the Code) that disallowed a deduction for ordinary and necessary
business expenses if the expense was for lobbying.205 Although like
Speiser, a rule of tax had the effect of limiting speech, the Court
unanimously concluded that “Speiser ha[d] no relevance.”206 The
petitioners in Cammarano, the Court said were “not being denied a
tax deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected
activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activities
entirely out of their own pockets.”207 Accordingly, a SpeiserCammarano dichotomy emerged: Is the rule “aimed at the
suppression of dangerous ideas,”208 or is it just a decision not to
subsidize a protected activity? If the former, then there is a burden on
speech; if the latter, there is no burden.
In the 1983 decision, TWR, the Court considered whether
conditioning tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Code on
refraining from substantial lobbying activity was constitutional.209
The Court said that the unconstitutional condition model of Speiser
was not the right one:
The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible
contributions to support its non-lobbying activity, nor does it
deny TWR any independent benefit on account of its
201 Id.

at 515.
at 518 (citations omitted).
203 Id. at 519 (quoting Am. Comm’ns Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)).
204 Id. at 529.
205 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 499–500 (1959).
206 Id. at 513.
207 Id.
208 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519 (quoting Am. Comm’ns Assn., 339 U.S. at 402) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
209 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 541 (1983).
202 Id.
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intention to lobby. Congress has merely refused to pay for the
lobbying out of public moneys. This Court has never held that
Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here to a
person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.210
Noting that it would be a different case if the rule was “aim[ed] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas,”211 the Court found “no indication
that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any
demonstration that it has had that effect.”212 Accordingly, the Court
said the case was controlled by Cammarano and upheld the lobbying
rule.213
2. The Speiser-Cammarano-TWR Trilogy Discussed.
This trilogy of cases requires some discussion. Notably, because
Speiser came first, the Court in Cammarano and TWR had to
articulate a distinction, which the Court did, but in a somewhat
conclusory fashion. The key statement in Cammarano, that
“[p]etitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they
engage in constitutionally protected activities,”214 seems in one sense
incorrect. From the petitioners’ standpoint, it appears that they are
being denied a tax deduction because of a special rule that targets
constitutionally protected activities. Were it not for the rule, a
deduction generally would be available. Similarly, Justice Rehnquist’s
statement in TWR quoted above that the statute “does not deny TWR
the right to receive deductible contributions to support its nonlobbying activity” or “deny TWR any independent benefit on account
of its intention to lobby”215 is very hard to make sense of on its terms.
The Code does deny TWR the right to receive deductible
contributions if TWR lobbies to a substantial extent. Further, the
Code does deny TWR an independent benefit—that of tax
exemption—if TWR intends to substantially lobby.216
210 Id.

at 545.
at 548 (quotations and citations omitted).
212 Id. Arguably, this statement may provide a footing for an as-applied challenge to the
Political Activities Prohibition. The reference to the “effect” of the provision invites an
argument that the result of the Rule has been to suppress ideas.
213 Id. at 546.
214 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
215 461 U.S. at 545.
216 In his concurrence in TWR, Justice Blackmun specifically notes this part of Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion and says that it can only make sense if the alternate structure of unlimited
lobbying through an affiliated organization is permitted. Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
In such a case, TWR can continue to be eligible to receive deductible contributions with respect
to its non-lobbying activity and get the benefit of charitable exemption, notwithstanding the
lobbying of a controlled affiliate.
211 Id.
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Nevertheless, although the Court’s statements in Cammarano and
TWR are not clear explanations of the Court’s reasoning, there is an
important and controlling, if somewhat fuzzy, distinction drawn with
Speiser: the purpose of the law. Really, the statements quoted in
Cammarano and TWR are the Court’s effort to state that the rules of
the federal tax code had a different purpose from the state rule at issue
in Speiser and that the difference was constitutionally significant.
Yes, speech is burdened as a practical matter in each case, but only in
Speiser was the purpose of the rule to burden speech, i.e., it was
“‘frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”217
To see this, further discussion of Speiser is necessary. One aspect
of Speiser that is often overlooked is that the Court assumed without
deciding that California had the power to “deny tax exemptions to
persons who engage in the proscribed speech for which they might be
fined or imprisoned.”218 Thus, the Court did not address the question
of the constitutionality of the loyalty oath as a condition of property
tax exemption as such. Instead, the Court invalidated the oath on
procedural due process grounds because the method California used
to enforce the oath was unfair.219
In Speiser, the Court was moved because the California law in
effect was established to force veterans to prove a substantive
question: namely, their loyalty to the regime.220 Merely signing the
oath was not enough to satisfy the burden; rather, it was “but a part of
the probative process by which the State [sought] to determine which
taxpayers [fell] into the proscribed category.”221 And the State could
subpoena applications and investigate whether the veterans were
“proper persons” to qualify for tax exemption.222 The Court likened
the loyalty oath and its process of proof to a legislature declaring a
person guilty of a crime, and then making them prove their
innocence.223 Thus, “[t]he question for decision . . . [was] whether this
allocation of the burden of proof” met due process demands.224
Although putting the burden on the taxpayer normally raises no
concerns, the Court found that this case was different because “the
purported tax was shown to be in reality a penalty for a crime,” 225
217 Speiser v. Randall, 357, U.S. 513, 519 (1957) (quoting Am. Comm’ns Assn. v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)).
218 Id. at 520.
219 Id. at 529.
220 Id. at 528.
221 Id. at 522.
222 Id. at 521–22.
223 Id. at 523–24.
224 Id. at 523.
225 Id. at 525.

2/22/2012 5:30:46 PM

730

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3

and, as the Court had noted earlier, the speech in question here was a
crime.226 In such a case, greater procedural safeguards are required
“than when only the amount of [the taxpayer’s] tax liability is in
issue.”227
In sum, what the State of California attempted by the loyalty oath
was to establish through the tax exemption system a method to flush
out potential criminals. The law was a direct attempt to suppress the
speech of a particular class of persons. This was its purpose. But there
would be a different result, the Court said, if the “purpose was to
achieve an objective other than restraint on speech.”228
The contrast to the Political Activities Prohibition and lobbying
limitations of sections 501(c)(3) and 162(e) is notable. Perhaps, in the
Court’s view, the self-evident nature of the contrast explains the
Court’s fairly conclusory approach to distinguishing Speiser in both
cases. As discussed above, Congress’s purpose for the tax rules is not
related directly to speech.229 As the Court said in Cammarano, the
nondeductibility of lobbying expenses is a “sharply defined national
policy,”230 a provision of general applicability, extant for “more than
40 years.”231 Additionally, it said that “[n]ondiscriminatory denial of
deduction . . . is plainly not ‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas.’”232 Regarding the lobbying limitation on section 501(c)(3)
status, the Court said in TWR: “Congress has not infringed any First
Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity.
Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”233 Also,
it said that “Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as extensively
as it chose to subsidize other activities that nonprofit organizations
undertake to promote the public welfare.”234
Arguably beyond dispute is that the key distinction between
Cammarano and Speiser is the purpose of the law. In Speiser, the
State set out to deny speech. But, the Court in Cammarano said that
Congress had a revenue purpose in mind when enacting the lobbying
limitations of sections 162(e) and 501(c)(3).235 Thus, the otherwise
somewhat cryptic statements above in Cammarano about not denying
226 Id.

at 519.
at 525.
228 Id. at 527.
229 See supra Part II.B.1.
230 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 508 (1959). The Court said this twice. The
second time it incorporates the non-subvention/no subsidy rationale of Slee v. Commissioner. Id.
at 512 (citing Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d. Cir. 1930)).
231 Id. at 508.
232 Id. at 513 (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519).
233 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983).
234 Id. at 544.
235 See id. at 546 (noting that “Congress has simply chosen not to pay for . . . lobbying”).
227 Id.
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benefits or rights but merely refusing to pay for lobbying are really
just the Court’s affirmations of an accepted congressional purpose.
Speiser is also distinguishable from the hypothetical Our Country
in other important ways. Applying the constitutional conditions
doctrine in Speiser, the Court intimates that the loyalty oath bore no
relation to the benefit provided, i.e., the oath was “external” to the
benefit.236 By contrast, the Political Activities Prohibition (and the
lobbying limitation) is a condition that is “internal” to the benefit, or
rationally related to it. In other words, demanding loyalty has nothing
intrinsically to do with providing a property tax exemption. But
demanding nonpartisanship is related to determining the type of
benefit to be provided, e.g., delivery of charitable or educational
goods and services without the distraction of partisan politics. In
addition, Speiser, like Citizens United, also appeared to qualify as an
identity-based speech restriction. The loyalty oath applied to veterans.
A veteran is a veteran is a veteran—“though he be denied a tax
exemption, he remains a veteran.”237 Thus, the Court stressed that
California had singled out veterans, and conditioned their speech.238
By contrast, section 501(c)(3) organizations are a creature of the tax
code, and the condition is related to that tax status. That is, if a section
501(c)(3) organization be denied a tax exemption, it remains an
organization.
In sum, under the Speiser-Cammarano-TWR dichotomy, purpose
arguably is the most significant factor in determing whether a rule (be
it a condition or not) burdens speech. Although Speiser involved a
condition to exemption (the loyalty oath), this condition has a
different purpose from the federal conditions relating to exemption
and lobbying. The hypothetical Our Country, distinguishable from
Citizens United on the key factors of purpose, sanction, and a ban on
the corporate form, fits squarely in the Cammarano-TWR line. Under
this line, the Court is likely to conclude that the Political Activities
Prohibition is not a burden on speech. A case from the campaign
finance context, Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL”),239 underlines this point. In MCFL,
Justice Brennan easily concluded in discussing TWR, that the
lobbying restriction of section 501(c)(3) “would infringe no protected
activity, for there is no right to have speech subsidized by the
Government.”240 Accordingly, despite the fact that the Electioneering
236 Speiser
237 Id.

v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527–28 (1957).
at 528.

238 Id.
239 479
240 Id.

U.S. 238 (1986).
at 256 n.9. Justice Brennan here confirmed that although, as a practical matter, the
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Rule and the Political Activities Prohibition have the effect of
suppressing speech, the two rules may nonetheless fairly be
characterized as involving in one case but not the other a burden of a
fundamental right.241
III. CAUTIONARY NOTES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHARITABLE
DEDUCTION
The analysis in Part II of this Article is intended to show that as a
matter of law the Court in deciding Our Country could and should
distinguish Citizens United, follow the established Cammarano-TWR
model, and hold that the Political Activities Prohibition is consistent
with the Constitution. That said, there are enough facial similarities
between the Electioneering Rule and the Political Activities
Prohibition, and questions raised by the case law, potentially to tip the
scales on the fairly nuanced inquiry into whether a rule burdens
speech for First Amendment purposes. Or, in the alternative, perhaps
the Court could be led to conclude that the Political Activities
Prohibition can survive a facial challenge, but not an as-applied
challenge. This Part examines factors that perhaps could lead the
Court to such conclusions. As argued below, however, even if the
Court took either approach, the impact would be slight. This is
because a separate constitutional analysis is required for the Political
Activities Prohibition for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) and
for tax deduction under section 170. Any possible constitutional
infirmities that may exist with respect to section 501(c)(3) do not
exist with respect to section 170.

Political Activities Prohibition affects speech, it does not follow as a legal conclusion that it is a
rule that “suppresses speech” as such, rather, it suppresses subsidized speech.
241 Furthermore, even if the Court concluded that the Political Activities Prohibition was a
burden on speech, and that strict scrutiny applied, there is still a case to be made that defining
charity as exclusive of political activity serves a compelling state interest. See Steffen N.
Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the
Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875, 890 (2001) (discussing the
possible justification that a limited charity definition serves the State’s interest in not compelling
taxpayers to subsidize political speech). Although it is outside the scope of this article to make
such a case, for all the reasons discussed above, plus the additional loss of revenue to the
Treasury, and the difficulty administering any alternative scheme, see infra Part IV, the status
quo is defensible as a compelling policy with an indirect effect on speech. But see Houck, supra
note 25, at 86 (arguing that “we limit charities in politics because we don’t believe in our gut
that they belong there”).
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A. Purpose to Penalize Speech
Justice Douglas’ concurrence in Speiser highlights one fault line.
In Speiser, Justice Douglas emphasized his agreement with the Court
that the loyalty oath was problematic because it placed an
unacceptable burden on citizens to prove their loyalty, contrary to the
presumption of innocence.242 But he also expressed a concern that if
the California rule was aimed “not to apprehend criminals but to
penalize advocacy, it likewise must fall.”243 To the extent the
hypothetical Our Country Court views the Political Activities
Prohibition not as a decision not to subsidize speech, but rather as an
effort to penalize advocacy, this argument could carry greater force.
The main support for such a view would likely come from the
direct legislative history of the Political Activities Prohibition.
Certainly, the circumstantial evidence of its enactment suggests that
Senator Johnson shoved through the prohibition in response to an
electoral attack by a putative charitable organization.244 But, as argued
in Part I of this Article, the better view of the Rule is to acknowledge
it as the codification of a decision that was decades in the making,
one that largely confirmed initial instincts that the meaning of charity
is nonpolitical and education does not include propaganda. Further, as
argued in Part II.B.2 of this Article, Congress’s treatment of advocacy
generally under the Code’s tax-exempt organization provisions
suggests that penalizing advocacy is not a purpose of the tax
treatment.
B. The Penalty Effect and the Charitable Deduction: Significance and
Sufficiency of an Alternate Channel
Another strand of concern identified by Justice Douglas, this time
through his concurring opinion in Cammarano, is whether a rule
might operate, irrespective of its purpose, to penalize speech.245
Recall that Cammarano concerned the constitutionality of denying a
business expense deduction for lobbying. Justice Douglas said that,
for him, Cammarano would be a different case if the result of a
taxpayer’s lobbying was that the taxpayer lost all deductions for
ordinary and necessary business expenses.246 This would be to
“plac[e] a penalty on the exercise of First Amendment rights,” which
242 357 U.S. at 535 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Alexander Hamilton and the role
loyalty oaths played in sparking Revolution).
243 Id.
244 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
245 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring).
246 Id.
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he said “was in substance what [California] did in Speiser.”247
Although to a certain extent, the question of whether a rule has a
punitive purpose or a penalty effect may overlap, a rule could be
enacted with innocent intentions but punitive results and perhaps be
unconstitutional on that basis alone. Accordingly, the Political
Activities Prohibition should be analyzed from the perspective of a
penalty effect.
The penalty effect could be an issue for purposes of tax exemption
under section 501(c)(3) because the “taxpayer,” i.e., the organization,
loses the entire benefit of exemption even for minor or insubstantial
violations.248 This aspect of the political activity and lobbying rules249
has led some commentators to conclude that, either as a matter of
policy or as a matter of constitutional necessity, the lobbying and
political activity rules should be changed.250 As Justice Douglas
argued, if the Political Activities Prohibition serves as a penalty for
speech, then it may fit the Speiser model.251 To put a label on the
argument, the Rule would be an unconstitutional condition of taxexempt status.
One answer to this concern has been through the alternate channel
analysis,252 namely that the penalty effect is avoided because of the
availability of an alternate channel for speech. This was the argument
made by Justice Blackmun’s concurrence and to a lesser extent the
majority in TWR.253 But TWR concerned the lobbying limit of section
247 Id. Of course, the penalty effect (losing all business deductions) was not an issue in
Cammarano because the disallowance rule affected only lobbying expenses and not other trade
or business expenses. Id.
248 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the IRS should
allow charities greater leeway when enforcing the Political Activities Prohibition).
249 There is more flexibility in the lobbying context. See Charles E. Hodges II & Edward
M. Manigault, Political Activity and Lobbying by Charities: How Far Can it Go? What are the
Risks?, 93 J. TAX’N 177, 179 (2000) (“Unlike the absolute prohibition on political intervention, a
charity may, to a certain extent, be involved in activities intended to influence legislation.”).
Organizations (other than churches) can opt-out of the facts and circumstances “no substantial
part” test and make an election under section 501(h), which offers more precision on the amount
of lobbying allowed and on the sanction. Id. at 180. As discussed above, the penalty for any
political activity formally is loss of exemption, though the IRS exercises considerable discretion
in this regard.
250 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 362–63 (proposing more carefully tailored rules about
the prohibition on campaign intervention for charitable organizations); Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit
Down and Count the Cost”: A Framework for Constitutionally Enforcing the 501(c)(3)
Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673, 677–79 (2009) (arguing that the Political
Activities Prohibition for charitable organizations is likely unconstitutional and proposing an
enforcement paradigm).
251 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring).
252 See supra Part II.D for a discussion of the alternate channel analysis. Another answer to
the question of the penalty effect may simply be one of judgment. The purpose of the law to
define charity and the tax context for the law may alone be sufficient to conclude that alternate
channel or not, there is no penalty effect involved.
253 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (discussing the TWR opinions).
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501(c)(3), and as commentators have noted, in general, the alternate
channel available for lobbying is more permissive than the alternate
channel available for political activity.254 Nevertheless, the D.C.
Circuit in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, upheld the constitutionality
of the Political Activities Prohibition by invoking affiliations of
section 501(c)(3), section 501(c)(4), and section 527 organizations as
a sufficient alternate channel.255
Accordingly, assuming that an alternate channel is still useful for
constitutional purposes,256 the question is the sufficiency of the
alternate channel upheld in Branch Ministries. The general criticism
would be that the multi-step structure of Branch Ministries (three
entities instead of two)257 is a burden or dilutes the speech. Arguably,
because the Court has approved a separate entity alternate channel
approach before and there is no contrary authority, the addition of the
section 527 layer is not a constitutional impediment.258
Notwithstanding the Court’s statements in Citizens United regarding
the burden of establishing a PAC,259 as argued above, the tax context
here should be distinguishable.260
In addition, to the extent that more or different channels are
needed, a reviewing court should consider the option of an alternate
channel through an affiliated for-profit corporation. Commentators—
254 See Chisolm, supra note 30, at 325 (noting that charitable organizations “may establish
and control a sister organization under section 501(c)(4), which imposes no restrictions on
lobbying”). This is because unlimited lobbying may be conducted through an affiliated section
501(c)(4) organization, but not unlimited political activity because section 501(c)(4)
organizations may not allow political activity to become a primary purpose. Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
255 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
256 As noted above, the Court disapproved of the PAC alternate channel for corporate
independent expenditures in Citizens United. But the Court’s derogation in Citizens United of
the PAC alternate channel should be seen in the context of the Court’s concern about the
Electioneering Rule as a ban on corporate speech. See supra Part II.D. The Political Activities
Prohibition is not such a ban.
257 211 F.3d at 143.
258 See Galston, supra note 12, at 911 (concluding that such a structure does not impose a
burden).
259 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010) (“PACs are burdensome
alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations”).
260 Discussion about the presence or absence of alternate channels emphasizes again the
usefulness of viewing the statutory scheme of the exemption provisions as a whole—as a
network. See Galston, supra note 181, at 103 (discussing, throughout the article, a “network”
approach to political activity by tax-exempt organizations). This provides a way of
accommodating organization-level speech among different tax categories. See supra text
accompanying note 183. If the default position is free speech and a taxable organization, then,
when the organization utilizes the exemption system, both positions change at the choice of the
organization. The organization is tax-exempt and the ability to speak as a for-profit entity may
be affected. The different exemption categories and ability to own for-profit and nonprofit
affiliates are boxes for how to treat different activities of the same, albeit formally separate,
organization for tax purposes.
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and the Court in TWR—have focused on tax-exempt affiliates because
this was the structure used in TWR, and is the one most commonly
employed. But if speech is the concern, the for-profit alternate
channel generally is available.261
One objection might be that a section 501(c)(3) organization does
not have the option of establishing a for-profit affiliate to engage in
political activity for the same reason that a section 501(c)(3)
organization may not directly set up a section 527 organization.262
The barrier here is the legislative history to the 1974 section 527
legislation, which said that a section 501(c)(3) organization may not
have an affiliated political organization.263 If the Court did decide,
however, to rest the decision on an alternate channel, one avenue
might be to mandate a simplified structure, for example, free the IRS
from the 1974 legislative history and specifically allow the
affiliation.264
Thus, up to this point, there are plausible arguments for concluding
that the Political Activities Prohibition does not have a penalty effect.
However, one overlooked aspect of the alternate channel that was
cited with approval in TWR may also be relevant; namely, that use of
an affiliated section 501(c)(4) organization does not in fact allow for
unfettered speech.265 This is because unlimited lobbying activity by a
section 501(c)(4) organization is permitted only if the lobbying
activity is related to the organization’s social welfare purpose.266 But
unrelated lobbying activity, if it is a substantial purpose of the
organization, does result in loss of section 501(c)(4) status.267
261 Indeed, the Code explicitly contemplates tax-exempt organizations owning for profit
organizations and provides for the appropriate tax treatment. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(13) (2006)
(providing special rules for amounts received from controlled entities).
262 There is an exception for activity related to affecting a judicial nomination. See supra
note 139.
263 S. Rep. No. 93–1357, at 30 (1974) (noting that section 527 was “not intended to affect
in any way the prohibition against certain exempt organizations (e.g., section 501(c)(3))
engaging in ‘electioneering’”).
264 Nothing statutorily appears to prevent the IRS from allowing such a structure, but
nonetheless, with legislative history to the contrary, the IRS is unlikely to change current
practice without clear direction from a higher authority.
265 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 561 U.S. 540, 543 (1983) (emphasis
added) (“Section 501(c)(4) organizations . . . are permitted to engage in substantial lobbying to
advance their exempt purposes.”).
266 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006) (“[O]rganizations not organized for profit but operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare . . . and the net earnings of which are devoted
exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.”).
267 See Rev. Rul. 2004–6, 2004–1 C.B. 328 (“Organizations that are exempt from federal
income tax under § 501(a) as organizations described in § 501(c)(4) . . . may, consistent with
their exempt purpose, publicly advocate positions on public policy issues.”); Rev. Rul. 81–95,
1981–1 C.B. 332 (“Thus, an organization may carry on lawful political activities and remain
exempt under section 501(c)(4) as long as it is primarily engaged in activities that promote
social welfare.”).
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Accordingly, the section 501(c)(3) organization’s section 501(c)(4)
alternate channel is an unrestricted alternate only to the extent of the
relatedness of the lobbying to the exempt purpose of the
organization.268
There is no indication that this issue was directly considered by the
Court in TWR. The question then is whether the First Amendment in
the tax-exempt organization context is concerned with a relatedunrelated distinction or, instead, is concerned with speech as speech,
related or not. If a related-unrelated distinction has significance for
the First Amendment, then consistent with the TWR alternate channel
(which protected only related lobbying), a sufficient alternate channel
for political activities need be only for related political activity.269 If,
however, the First Amendment does not take into account tax
concerns, then assuming that an alternate structure is constitutionally
significant, one issue relevant for both the lobbying limitation and the
Political Activities Prohibition, is the extent to which an unrestricted
outlet for the speech—related or not—is required. If the use of
affiliates—exempt or for-profit—is held to be an insufficient alternate
channel, then any limitation—related or unrelated—on lobbying or
political activity is jeopardized.
This raises yet another major challenge to the tax exemption
system potentially presented by Citizens United: the extent to which
any limitations on speech are permitted in connection with the tax
exemption of any exempt organization. This is because the entire
classification of an organization as exempt is to a certain extent based
upon the power of Congress to delineate a purpose and promote or
classify it exclusive to other things. If Congress does not have the
power to limit speech in relation to a tax classification, then the
constitutionality of many other tax classifications also are likely to
come into question.
In any event, even if the Court decided that a sufficient alternate
channel was constitutionally necessary, that the currently available
channels are insufficient, and as a result, held that the Political
268 This presents an interesting issue with respect to the lobbying limitation, which may
turn out to be more restrictive from a speech perspective than the Political Activities
Prohibition. This is because there is no outlet for unlimited, unrelated lobbying activity by an
exempt organization. By contrast, there potentially is such an outlet for political activity through
use of a section 527 political organization. The political organization option is not available for
unlimited lobbying, however, because lobbying is not considered an exempt purpose under
section 527. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (2006) (defining “exempt function” as “the function of
influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office . . . or the election of Presidential or VicePresidential electors”).
269 As discussed in Part IV, infra, however, the related-unrelated distinction itself is
problematic in the political activity context.
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Activities Prohibition is unconstitutional, not much need change.
Section 501(c)(3) would be rewritten to omit the prohibition, but
conditioning a charitable deduction on a recipient’s abstention from
political activity would not necessarily be affected.270
And this leads to another seemingly unremarked aspect of the
alternate channel analysis: it only affects exemption. It says nothing
about deductions. Indeed, implicit in Justice Blackmun’s approval of
the section 501(c)(4) alternate channel is affirmation of Cammarano
as applied to section 170 of the Code.271 To see this, note that Justice
Blackmun’s alternate channel only preserves tax-exemption for the
organization (through use of an affiliate). Lost, however, is the ability
to receive tax deductible contributions, at least with respect to the
organization’s lobbying activity.272 In other words, the alternate
channel results in a loss of an indirect tax benefit; yet this was not of
concern to Justice Blackmun or to the Court—the challenge, and their
focus, was on the exemption condition.
Shifting then to deductions and section 170 of the Code, the need
for an alternate channel for the organization’s speech does not factor
into whether the political activity and lobbying limitations of section
170 are constitutional. This is because denying an individual or
entity’s deduction for a contribution to an organization that engages
in political or lobbying activity has only an indirect effect on the
speech, at best. Such a rule does not affect the speech of the
individual or entity as such. It does not even affect the ability of
individuals to associate and speak collectively (which they remain
free to do). Rather, as the Court has said, such a rule merely reflects
Congress’s decision not to subsidize the speech.273 In this regard, it is
270 As currently written, a charitable contribution does not exist for contributions to an
organization that is “disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in . . . any
political campaign . . . .” I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). Accordingly, if the Political Activities
Prohibition of section 501(c)(3) were held unconstitutional, section 170(c)(2)(D) on its face
would be to no effect as a technical matter. But even if courts did not read into section 170 a no
political activity requirement, section 170 could easily be redrafted to deny a charitable
deduction for contributions to organizations that engage in political activity or substantial
lobbying.
271 Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 553 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (“A § 501(c)(3) organization's right to speak is not infringed, because it is free to
make known its views on legislation through its § 501(c)(4) affiliate without losing tax benefits
for its nonlobbying activities.”).
272 See id. (“The § 501(c)(4) affiliate would not be eligible to receive tax-deductible
contributions.”).
273 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (finding that Congress’s refusal
to allow deductions for political activity “express[es] a determination . . . that since purchased
publicity can influence the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the
community, everyone in the community should stand on the same footing as regards its
purchase so far as the Treasury of the United States is concerned”).
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noteworthy that the speech at issue in Cammarano involved the most
sympathetic type of lobbying expense—self-defense lobbying.274 Yet
the Court had no sympathy.275
Further, the penalty effect does not appear to be an issue for the
charitable contribution deduction under section 170. If a taxpayer
makes a contribution to a charity that impermissibly lobbies or
engages in political activity, the taxpayer’s ability to take a charitable
contribution deduction as a general matter is not affected. Thus, the
taxpayer is not penalized in the broad sense that concerned Justice
Douglas.
In short, although it may be that the section 170 limitations were
enacted as a backstop to the section 501(c)(3) limits,276 they
nonetheless would require a distinct constitutional challenge to
invalidate.277 Without such a successful challenge to the section 170
limitations, removal of the section 501(c)(3) limits may not change
much, at least with respect to organizations that want to be eligible to
receive tax deductible contributions.278 Such organizations would
continue to abide by the prohibition.
C. Implications of Reliance on Constitutional Conditions Analysis.
So far, the analysis has not directly discussed the doctrine of
constitutional conditions, lamented by commentators for its
incoherence.279 Under this doctrine, a condition made in connection
274 Petitioners were owners of wholesale alcohol businesses. One was lobbying against a
bill in the State of Washington that would give the state complete control over wholesale
alcohol sales. The other was lobbying against a statewide prohibition bill in Arkansas. Id. at
500–02.
275 See id. at 513 (affirming the lower court’s ruling against both petitioners).
276 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
277 A similar analysis also should be made with respect to eligibility to receive tax-exempt
bond financing under section 145 of the Code. Like the charitable deduction, the tax benefit is
not provided directly to the section 501(c)(3) organization. Rather, the purchaser of the bonds
receives the benefit of tax-exempt interest. I.R.C. § 145 (2006). For section 501(c)(3)
organizations that rely on the availability of tax-exempt financing, such as charitable hospitals, a
Political Activities Prohibition could be made a condition on receipt of such financing
irrespective of whether such a prohibition is retained as a condition of tax exemption. In other
words, for purposes of the Political Activities Prohibition, each of the tax benefits currently
associated with tax-exempt status should be analyzed distinctly. For an argument that the tax
benefits currently associated with section 501(c)(3) status should be disaggregated, see
Colinvaux, supra note 100, at 64.
278 Professors Crimm and Winer advocate removal of the Political Activities Prohibition as
an exemption condition but retaining it for charitable deduction purposes. They note that this
might not have a significant impact on houses of worship, many of which rely on contributions
from individuals who do not itemize deductions and so who do not claim a deduction in any
event. See CRIMM & WINER, supra note 27, at 327. Crimm and Winer also note that the impact
on other section 501(c)(3) organizations is “less clear.” Id.
279 The confusion surrounding the constitutional conditions doctrine stems from the
inscrutable framework for decision and inconsistent application by the courts. See e.g., Richard
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with providing a government benefit may be unconstitutional even if
the government is under no obligation to provide the benefit.280 The
central concern is that if the government is prohibited from directly
limiting a person’s rights, then the government should not be able to
so limit a person’s rights through the imposition of a condition in
connection with a benefit. Speiser, Cammarano, and TWR are often
cited as “constitutional conditions” cases.281 Importantly, TWR, and
its alternate channel analysis have been cited approvingly in other
constitutional conditions cases, such as Rust v. Sullivan282 and FCC v.
League of Women Voters of California.283 Accordingly, the Court’s
analysis of alternate channels in Rust and League of Women Voters284
is commonly cited in scholarship in connection with the Political
Activities Prohibition because of their relevance to the alternate
channel analysis.285
However, the cases have been grouped together by courts not only
because of alternate channel but also because each case involves the

Epstein, Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413 (1989).
280 As outlined by Professor Chisolm, a government decision not to subsidize speech is,
everyone agrees, fine. But if the government provides a benefit, and the grant or denial of the
benefit is based on viewpoint or the content of speech or on suspect classifications, then the
condition is reviewed subject to strict scrutiny and a compelling state interest is required.
However, if the grant or denial of the benefit is just “a simple policy of nonsubsidy,” then only
rational basis review is required. Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 27. TWR equated tax
exemption with a subsidy, said that Congress had merely decided not to subsidize lobbying, and
then appears to have applied a rational basis review. In the context of political activities,
Professor Chisolm, writing however before the Branch Ministries decision, argued that the
penalty effect mooted by Justice Douglas in Cammarano, should trigger a heightened scrutiny
because of the absence of a sufficient alternate channel for political activities.
281 In Speiser, the Court held that the loyalty oath was an unconstitutional condition for the
reasons stated supra. In Cammarano and TWR, the Court held that the conditions were
constitutional.
282 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
283 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984). Here, the Court struck down a federal law that provided
funding to noncommercial television and radio stations on the condition that such stations not
engage in editorializing. Central to the Court’s reasoning was that the law did not allow for the
editorializing activity even through a separate affiliate. The Court cited the TWR alternate
channel approvingly, stating that if the stations were permitted to “establish ‘affiliate’
organizations which could then use the station’s facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds,
such a statutory mechanism would plainly be valid”.
284 Both cases stand for the general proposition that an alternate channel is relevant, and so
both offer some support for the political activities prohibition to the extent that its alternate
channel is sufficient. On the one hand, Rust could be distinguished because the alternate channel
in Rust arguably is “better” than that provided by the tax rules because in Rust no separate
organization was required; rather, the separation could occur within the existing organization.
On the other hand, League of Women Voters provides support for the separate affiliation option.
285 Galston, supra note 181; Leff, supra note 250; Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 27.
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provision of a government benefit.286 In Rust and League of Women
Voters, the benefits are direct public funding.287 In TWR, the benefits
cited are the subsidy-like exemptions and deductions.288 Importantly,
under a constitutional conditions analysis, from the provision of a
“benefit” comes a facilitation of government conditions that may
directly affect fundamental rights. Thus, in Rust, the Court upheld a
condition on the funding of family planning services under Title X of
the Public Health Service Act, namely that no abortion counseling be
provided with the federal funds.289 The Court noted that the funding
scheme distinguished between a project “grantee” and the funded
project of the grantee (a “Title X Project”), and that grantee as grantee
remained free to provide such counseling, just not in connection with
the separately established, federally funded project.290 Thus, the
abortion-related condition did not burden the grantee’s First
Amendment rights to speak.291
This sort of micromanaging may be permissible in the context of
direct public funding. The question is the extent to which it is
permitted in the context of government benefits to charitable
organizations. Reliance on Rust to uphold the Political Activities
Prohibition could run the risk of turning the “independent” sector into
a series of “Project Xs,” subject to explicit direction by the federal
government. In other words, if Rust applies conceptually, then the
door may be open to conditioning any number of restraints on
charitable organizations without constitutional impediment.

286 The Court called Rust v. Sullivan “a case of the Government refusing to fund activities,
including speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded.” 500
U.S. at 194–195. The Rust Court cited a case in which the Court upheld a state’s decision to
subsidize childbirth services but not abortion, providing that the government may “‘make a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the
allocation of public funds.’” Id. at 192–193 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
The Court then cited TWR for the proposition that the “legislature’s decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.” Id. at 193 (quoting Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
287 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203 (prohibiting recipients of family planning funds under Title X
from engaging in abortion counseling); League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 402
(finding a ban on editorializing by an educational broadcasting station that received direct public
funding violated the First Amendment).
288 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (noting that
“appropriations are comparable to tax exemptions and deductions”).
289 500 U.S. at 203.
290 Id. at 196 (noting that preventing an organization that receives funding under Title X
from counseling about abortion “do[es] not force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related
speech; [it] merely require[s] that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct from
Title X activities”).
291 Id. at 203.
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This risk is present because TWR characterizes tax exemption as a
subsidy—thus inviting a constitutional conditions analysis.292 But the
subsidy characterization is not necessarily accurate. Whether section
501(c)(3) provides a subsidy may depend upon the rationale for
charitable tax exemption.293 To the extent that section 501(c)(3) is
designed to provide a cash grant to the organization in the amount of
income tax the organization would otherwise owe, per TWR, then
perhaps there is a subsidy.
But this question has been debated since the outset of the
exemption in 1913. If charitable exemption is recognition of a cosovereign, then exemption makes sense but not as a “subsidy.”294 If
charitable exemption is to lessen the burdens of government,295 then it
is less of a subsidy than a division of labor. If charitable exemption
reflects a normative principle that “good” organizations simply
should not be taxed, perhaps exemption is not a subsidy in the
traditional sense of the term. Rather, the exemption just recognizes
that charitable organizations should, as a matter of tax policy, be
taxed differently from for-profit organizations. Further, even if there
is a subsidy conceptually, for many if not most charitable
organizations, tax-exempt status does not provide much if any actual
tax savings. And it would therefore be ironic to base the
constitutionality of onerous conditions on the provision of a subsidy
that is actually of little monetary value. Here again, however, section
501(c)(3) and section 170 are distinct. Although some have argued
that section 170 is not a subsidy,296 the more common approach is the

292 See TWR, 461 U.S. at 544 (“Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of
subsidy that is administered through the tax system.”).
293 See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX
L. REV. 283, 283–84 (2011) (discussing “whether the income tax exemption for charities is
consistent with normal income tax principles or is a departure that must be justified as a
subsidy”).
294 See Brody, supra note 126, at 592 (footnote omitted) (“While most observers have
described tax exemption as a subsidy, a zero rate of tax differs qualitatively, not just
quantitatively, from a one-percent rate of tax.”).
295 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 75–1860, at 19 (1938) (“The exemption from taxation of
money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.”).
296 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 309, 313 (1972) (discussing the charitable tax deduction in terms of a consumption tax).
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subsidy view.297 Indeed, unlike tax exemption, the charitable
deduction has long been considered a “tax expenditure.”298
The discussion above has several implications. Notwithstanding
TWR, the constitutional conditions doctrine’s applicability to
charitable tax exemption because it is a government-provided subsidy
is not self-evident. At a minimum, assuming that the government is
providing a “benefit,” it is important to maintain distinctions between
the benefit of tax exemption and the benefit of direct subsidies such
as those provided in Rust and League of Women Voters. Although the
cases commonly are grouped together, the difference with respect to
the benefits provided suggests that as a general matter a different
analysis of the condition should apply.
But if the constitutional conditions doctrine applies with less force
to tax-exemption, or arguably does not apply at all, what is the effect
on the analysis of the constitutionality of the Political Activities
Prohibition? On the one hand, if exemption is not a benefit, this
undermines the argument made in Part II.E that the Rule is not
identity based speech because it makes section 501(c)(3) status less
like a tax classification (i.e., an invention of the tax code) and more
like a core entity type, akin to a corporation. Thus, following the
reasoning of Citizens United, the Political Activities Prohibition is
more like a ban on corporate speech than was argued earlier. On the
other hand, even if charitable tax exemption is not a government
“benefit,” it can still be upheld for all the reasons stated previously—
the Rule’s purpose is not to suppress speech and Congress has a
sufficient interest in having a nonpartisan charitable sector. Perhaps
most importantly, however, the question of whether section 501(c)(3)
provides a “benefit” highlights again the distinction between sections
501(c)(3) and 170. So even if the question casts additional doubt on
the constitutionality of the Political Activities Prohibition for
exemption purposes, it says nothing about the constitutionality of the
prohibition for deduction purposes. And, to a certain extent, it is
really section 170 that is the more important of the two.299 Congress
297 See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role
of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 517 (2010) (discussing the subsidy theory and
noting that it is the more “common” view); Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 27, at 274–75
(discussing the various subsidy theories of federal taxation).
298 The five-year (2008–2012) tax expenditure for the charitable tax deduction is estimated
to be $264 billion. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008–2012, at 53, 55–56 (Comm. Print 2008) (combining
$35.9 billion for education, $204.9 billion for social services, and $23.2 billion for health).
299 Again, it is important to keep in mind the several benefits associated with section
501(c)(3) status, and the varying importance of one or the other to a particular organization. For
some organizations, exemption might be of great significance. For others, it might be the
deduction. For still others, it might be the ability to benefit from tax-exempt financing. To
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has a stronger spending purpose and the tax benefit arguably is more
significant to the charities (even though less direct).
D. Summary
In brief, this Part has argued that even if the Court was persuaded
that the purpose of the Political Activities Prohibition was to suppress
speech or that the prohibition had a penalty effect, and therefore
concluded that the prohibition was unconstitutional, present law
would not change significantly. The disallowance of the charitable
deduction for contributions to organizations that engage in political
activity requires a distinct constitutional challenge, which it should
easily survive. In addition, the charitable sector should be mindful of
the perils of relying on a constitutional conditions analysis in support
of the Political Activities Prohibition. That analysis could open the
door to increased government involvement in the affairs of charitable
organizations.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE STATUS QUO ARE WANTING
So far, the analysis has focused largely on whether the Political
Activities Prohibition is constitutional as such without much
comment on alternatives. What if, notwithstanding the arguments
made in Part II of this Article, the Court concluded that the
prohibition was an unconstitutional burden on speech? What would
this mean? Such a conclusion would raise a number of difficult
questions. Must the law allow unlimited political activity by
charities? May a political purpose be a charitable purpose? Are
political activities to be considered as an acceptable means to a
(nonpolitical) charitable end? Are limits to the political activity of
charities permissible, and if so, what kind of limits? These are key
questions that should inform not only the constitutional analysis, but
also, assuming the constitutionality of the Political Activities
Prohibition, whether Congress should, on its own initiative, modify it.
A. One Extreme: Congress May Not Restrict the Political Activity of
Charitable Organizations
At first blush, it might be assumed that if the Political Activities
Prohibition is unconstitutional, then no limit or restraint upon the

undertake a detailed analysis of each is beyond the scope of this Article. The point here is to
highlight that answering the question of the prohibition with respect to one benefit—that of
exemption—does not answer the question with respect to other benefits.
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political activities of charities is allowed. Such a conclusion certainly
would be the easiest to administer and enforce, as there would be
nothing to administer or enforce. The line between political and
nonpolitical activity, between education and propaganda, would not
have to be drawn. There would be no facts and circumstances to
consider.
Such a conclusion also would best facilitate core First Amendment
speech. Facing no restraint, charities could speak and spend on
political activity as much as desired. To the extent that protecting
speech is the critical concern, discarding the prohibition and replacing
it with unfettered speech seems an easy and intuitively attractive
solution.300 But this overlooks a critical point, namely that unless
there is some limit on the political activity of section 501(c)(3)
organizations, the charitable purpose requirement301 would lose much
of its meaning. Currently, it is because of the Political Activities
Prohibition that a section 501(c)(3) organization as such stands apart,
or operates distinctly, from its actual or contemplated political
activity. That is, because a section 501(c)(3) organization is
prohibited from participating in politics, by definition there must be a
meaningful “charity” in existence apart from any political activity. It
is from this vantage point that we often think of the merits of the
Political Activities Prohibition: i.e., whether a charity, viewed
separately from any political activity, may or should be able to
engage in politics.
But, without the Political Activities Prohibition or any limit on
political activities, this vital distinction would erode. There would be
nothing to prevent an organization formed to “help feed the poor”
from doing nothing other than campaign intervention.
Because the charitable purpose requirement has no substantive or
positive content302—it is after all a purpose requirement—an
organization with the purpose of helping to feed the poor should
qualify under the organizational and operational test even if all its
activities were political. Clearly, the organizational test would be no
barrier, as helping to feed the poor is a charitable purpose.303 The
300 If such an approach were adopted, it would call into question limitations on the political
activities of other exempt organizations and the constitutionality of the tax under section
527(f)(1), which provides that an exempt organization, which is not a political organization,
must include certain amounts in gross income. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1) (2006).
301 Again, “charitable” here includes all the section 501(c)(3) exempt purposes: charitable,
educational, religious, scientific, etc. I.R.C. § 503(c).
302 See Colinvaux, supra note 100, at 14–15 (discussing the absence of positive
requirements for charitable status).
303 The organizational test requires that the organization be organized exclusively for
exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b) (as amended in 2008). Typically it may be
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operational test too would be satisfied. Here, the regulations say that
to be operated exclusively for exempt purposes, the primary purpose
of the organization must be an exempt purpose. This primary purpose
test is met “if [the organization] engages primarily in activities which
accomplish” the exempt purpose.304 Under this formulation, activities
themselves are not necessarily either charitable or uncharitable, but
are viewed in connection with the ends served. Accordingly, an
organization that favored candidates who want to help “feed the poor”
would be engaged in an activity to accomplish exempt purposes.
In short, without any restriction on political activities, it is not
clear whether anything would prevent a purely political organization
from qualifying as a section 501(c)(3) organization. The term “PAC”
would have to be modified to include not only “political action
committee” but also “political action charity.” In addition to all the
other types of present law charities (hospital, college or university,
church, scientific organization, etc.) a charity could also be an action
organization,305 or what we think of today as a political organization.
B. Assuming Change to the Prohibition, Some Limit Should Be
Contemplated
If equating a political organization and a charity is unpalatable,
one might want to consider various limitations. One approach, based
on the current way of thinking about charity, might be to allow
political activities but only for “real” charities, that is, charities that
have some quantum of charitable activity that is not political activity.
As a general matter, however, this would not work because our
system provides exemption based on purposes not activities.306 If the
purpose is legitimate and the activities plausibly are undertaken to
advance the purpose, the discussion ends. There is no inquiry into
whether an activity is charitable as such.307

satisfied through a statement in the organization’s governing instrument. Id. In general, “feeding
the poor” would qualify as a charitable purpose under the Treasury regulations. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (defining charitable to include “[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the
underprivileged”).
304 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1).
305 Note that because of the Political Activities Prohibition, the Treasury Regulations
provide that a section 501(c)(3) organization may not be an action organization. Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(i). An action organization includes an organization that engages in political
activity. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(ii).
306 Hopkins, supra note 25, at 72 (“The primary purpose test looks . . . to an organization’s
purpose rather than its activities.”).
307 Activities are, however, relevant. See infra Part IV.C. If activities serve a non-charitable
purpose, a substantial level of such activities may indicate that a primary purpose of the
organization is not charitable, and therefore the organization ceases to qualify under section
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Nevertheless, one might require as an affirmative obligation of
section 501(c)(3) status that an organization may not qualify unless it
conducts some level of activity that serves an exempt purpose and
that is not political activity. The obvious and difficult questions would
be how much nonpolitical activity is required and how it would be
measured. And any such requirement, though styled as an affirmative
obligation to conduct nonpolitical activity, would in effect be a limit
on the amount of political activity because inevitably, the requisite
amount of “good” activity would be defined in relation to the political
activity.308
Alternatively, one could attempt to draw a different line and say
that charitable exemption should be denied to organizations that are
really political organizations in disguise. Such an approach would be
to assert that there is a relevant distinction between exempt purposes
and political purposes, and that charitable exemption should be
granted only for “exempt” nonpolitical purposes. The analysis here
would not be on the political activities as such, but whether the
activities “truly” further an exempt purpose, or instead a political
purpose. This could be similar to the present law commerciality
doctrine, which denies charitable exemption if the activities of an
organization take on too much of a commercial hue, i.e., the
organization seems more like a for profit business than a charity.309
But, as in the commerciality context, the line distinguishing a
political purpose from an exempt purpose would likely be very
difficult to draw, especially in an area protected by the First
Amendment. For example, an organization could state its purpose as
finding ways to help the poor. If the organization promotes the

501(c)(3). See Better Bus. Bureau of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)
(stating that, for an educational non-profit organization, “the presence of a single
noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the
number or importance of truly educational purposes”).
308 For example, in order for such an affirmative requirement to have substance, the
nonpolitical activity must be substantial, otherwise a token amount would do. See I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) (2006) (“no substantial part” of the activities of a 501(c)(3) organization may attempt
“to influence legislation [or] . . . participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on
behalf of . . . any candidate for public office”). But substantiality likely would have meaning
only in relation to the amount of political activity. An organization with little-to-no political
activity would not have to undertake much nonpolitical activity to qualify. But an organization
with considerable political activity would have a higher nonpolitical activity threshold. This in
turn would encourage the organization to reduce the amount of political activity so as to
strengthen the substantiality of the nonpolitical activity. Assuming that the Supreme Court holds
the Political Activities Prohibition unconstitutional, all this raises the question of what sorts of
limits would be constitutionally acceptable and the rationale.
309 See generally John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487 (2002) (analyzing the rules that dictate amount of commercial
activity that a charity is allowed to engage in while retaining the charitable exemption).
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candidates it believes (or says it believes) are committed to that goal,
a principled challenge to the organization as “politically motivated”
would be very hard to establish (even if it were clear what being
politically motivated means).
Another limit might be to suggest that although political activity
should be permitted, it should be limited in extent. That is, if it is too
difficult to question an organization’s true purpose as political or not,
the quantum of activities of the organization could be used as a proxy
for the organization’s purposes. Thus, an organization with a lot of
political activity could be suspect because, one might argue, the more
political activity there is, the more likely the organization is really a
political organization and not a charity.310
But even if we knew how much political activity generally should
be equated with political purposes (10 percent? 50 percent?), there
appears to be no reason to assume that the amount of political activity
as such would have any meaningful bearing on an organization’s
“true” purpose.311 One could answer that it does not matter, we just
need to limit the amount of political activity as a prophylactic against
310 An activity-based limit would likely take one of two forms: something similar to the
current “no substantial part” rule that applies in the lobbying context, I.R.C. § 501(h) (2006), or
something like the rule in the section 501(c)(4) context, namely that the political activities may
not become so extensive as to become a primary purpose of the organization, Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990); Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981–1 C.B. 332 (“Thus, an
organization may carry on lawful political activities and remain exempt under section 501(c)(4)
as long as it is primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare.”). A “no substantial
part” rule seems especially problematic, assuming that the Political Activities Prohibition is
unconstitutional. If it is unconstitutional to bar political activities altogether because the speech
is so fundamental, it may not make much sense to say that political activities are constitutional
so long as the organization stops speaking after the first paragraph. And irrespective of the
constitutional question, a “no substantial part” approach would arguably be worse than the
current rule. For example, at least the current rule provides clarity on the question of how much
activity is permitted—zero. But a no substantial part rule would introduce new uncertainty on
the amount of permitted activity and new complexity. If a regime similar to that of section
501(h) were adopted, for example, it would be unlikely to satisfy organizations making missionbased arguments for allowing political activity, and all the benefits of the current rule (a
nonpartisan sector) would be lost, with little apparent gain. The section 501(c)(4) approach
would provide a more generous limit on political activities (capped so as to prevent a political
purpose from becoming a primary purpose) but also raises similar questions. See infra Part IV.C
for a more detailed discussion of these questions.
311 Indeed, many organizations, especially organizations that believe political activity is
required by the organization’s mission, would argue that political activity that is related to the
mission clearly serves an exempt purpose and so should not be subject to an arbitrary limit that
does not take the relatedness of the speech into account. See Elizabeth Kingsley & John
Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in Regulation
of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 90–91
(2004) (offering an example of the issues associated with a nonprofit organization attempting to
advance its purpose through political methods). If it could be established that an organization’s
political activity served a private end and not a charitable one, then it is a different question. But
no special rule would be needed for such a case because the private benefit doctrine already
should prohibit exemption.
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the political organization masquerading as charity. But then we have
not advanced very far from the Political Activities Prohibition in the
first place, which, among other things, is such a prophylactic.312
Furthermore, if it is unconstitutional to prohibit political activities,
why is it constitutional to allow just a little bit of such activities? This
too seems to be a difficult question to answer.
Yet another approach could be to treat political activity much like
any other, and subject it to a related-unrelated test.313 Activities are
neither inherently charitable nor noncharitable—their character
depends upon relatedness to an exempt purpose.314 Assuming that a
political purpose is not an exempt purpose, then, under this approach,
political activity must be examined to see whether it is related to an
exempt purpose. If it is related, then the activity is unrestricted. If it is
unrelated, then the activity is permitted, but may not become so
substantial that the purpose served becomes a primary purpose. If this
happens, then the charitable exemption is lost.315
The difficulties with this approach are similar to those discussed
previously in this Part regarding other possible limitations. First,
drawing a related-unrelated distinction would be extremely difficult.
Except in egregious cases, an organization, including a charity PAC,
should be able to trace political activity to some exempt purpose.
Second, adopting the related-unrelated paradigm involves limiting
political activities—namely, unrelated political activity may not
become substantial. To the extent the First Amendment is concerned
with protecting speech as speech, it would seem not to matter much
whether the speech is “related” to an organization’s exempt purpose.
Rather the question is whether it is burdened.
In addition, although a related-unrelated distinction may have
intuitive appeal because it is familiar, it may not make sense in the
speech context. Viewed under the First Amendment, we are talking
about the speech of a section 501(c)(3) organization as a section
501(c)(3) organization (a value the Court presumably would be
protecting if it struck down the Political Activities Prohibition). Does
312 See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (describing the prophylactic purpose of
the rule).
313 See supra notes 269–273 and accompanying text (discussing the related-unrelated
distinction made by section 501(c)(4)); see also Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981–1 C.B. 332 (finding that
an organization’s primary purpose must be related to promoting social welfare).
314 See supra notes 269–273 and accompanying text (discussing the related-unrelated
distinction made by section 501(c)(4)).
315 See Better Bus. Bureau of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (stating
that, for an educational non-profit organization, “the presence of a single noneducational
purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or
importance of truly educational purposes”).
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it make sense to say that a charity speaking as a charity is somehow
speaking in a way that is unrelated to itself? It would seem that the
presumption must be that organizational speech is in the best interest
of the organization, or at least is of the organization and so somehow
related to its (primary) purposes. If the charity speaks as the agent for
another, then there likely are private benefit problems, which are
covered by the private benefit doctrine.316 But a charity speaking as a
“person,” expressing views on its own behalf, is not speaking in a
related or unrelated fashion. Whatever the content—it is just speech,
and by definition the speech of a charity, which would seem to take
on an inherently “related” character. In short, a limit based on a
related-unrelated distinction would likely be no limit at all.
C. Taxing Speech: The Most Plausible Limitation
It is because of the futility of the above limitations that one might
resort to regulating the political speech of charities through the Code.
Namely, if it is unconstitutional to prohibit charities from engaging in
political activity, and no reasonable line can be drawn, then what
remains is to allow political activity by charities, but tax it. Such a
solution would really be a continuation of current law, but instead of
revocation of section 501(c)(3) status for engaging in political
activity, the sanction would be to tax the organization with respect to
the political activity.
This solution ties into perhaps the most forceful objection to the
Political Activities Prohibition—namely, the nature of the penalty for
violation. As noted above, the argument is that revocation of section
501(c)(3) status is a penalty disproportionate to the offense.317 Thus, a
narrower approach would be to provide for a tax based on the extent
of political activity, and therefore allow a charity to retain section
501(c)(3) status. This approach has some appeal because it does not
undermine the power of Congress to decide whether or not to
subsidize speech. Rather, it merely says that the penalty of revocation
of section 501(c)(3) status is an overbroad remedy.
Using the existing legal regime, the result generally would be to
treat expenses for political activity by section 501(c)(3) organizations
just like those of other tax-exempt organizations. A charity could
either make its political activity expenses318 from a separate
316 See

supra note 95 (defining the private benefit doctrine).
supra Part III.B.
318 Congress would have to fashion a definition of “political activity expenses.” Under
present law, there are multiple terms at play. A “political expenditure” is a defined term for
section 501(c)(3) organizations and generally means expenses in violation of the Political
Activities Prohibition. I.R.C. § 4955(d)(1) (2006). Such expenses are subject to an excise tax.
317 See
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segregated fund (or PAC)319 or forgo the PAC option, make the
expenses directly, and be subject to tax on the expenses under section
527(f)(1).320 Under that approach, the independent expenditures of
charities, for example, generally would be subject to tax.321
There are some pitfalls. Perhaps most importantly, the political
activities of charities that did not have expenditures directly
associated with the activity (such as endorsements, which may require
little-to-no direct expenditure) generally would not be captured. This
is important not only because such activities can be the most potent,
but also because failure to capture them undermines the rationale for
the taxing speech approach: although Congress may refuse to promote
political activity, it just must not over-punish. Accordingly, fully
capturing the value associated with all political activities is critical.
But, even if complex special rules could be developed rationally to
attribute some expenditure to each instance of political activity,322 a
missing link is that tax-exemption as such supports the entire section
501(c)(3) organization. Presumably, the reason for allowing a section
501(c)(3) organization to speak politically without using an
alternative structure would be that section 501(c)(3) provides a
distinct and valuable voice. But the value of that voice is to a certain
extent directly supported by the blanket section 501(c)(3) exemption,

I.R.C. § 4955(a)–(b). Alternatively, tax-exempt organizations that are not section 501(c)(3)
organizations and so not subject to an excise tax on their “political expenditures” are subject to
tax on expenses for an “exempt function” as that term is defined in section 527. I.R.C. §
527(e)(2). Confusingly, “exempt function” expenses are generally those made for political
purposes, i.e., for the exempt function of a political organization governed by section 527. Id.
319 Such a fund would be considered a political organization under section 527 and subject
to those rules. I.R.C. § 527(f)(3).
320 Section 527(f)(1) provides that a tax-exempt organization (other than a section 527
political organization) is subject to tax on the amount of its political expenses or the amount of
its investment income, whichever is less. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1). Thus, tax-exempt organizations
foregoing the PAC option can avoid the section 527(f)(1) tax to the extent they have no
investment income. Id.
321 Current Treasury Regulations reserve the rules for taxation of expenditures allowed by
FECA, which at the time of the reservation did not include independent expenditures, but, after
Citizens United, does. Treas. Reg. § 1.527–6(b)(3) (1980); see also Aprill, supra note 18, at 392
(explaining that “Citizens United is understood to mean that section 501(c)(4), section
501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations may make independent expenditures”). Accordingly, the
taxation of independent expenditures pursuant to section 527(f)(1) depends in part on the status
of the reserved regulations. Id. (observing that “the regulations currently treat no expenditure
permitted by the Federal Election Campaign Act as being for an exempt function subject to the
section 527(f) tax” because a paragraph that 527(f) refers to, section 527(b)(3), is currently
reserved).
322 See Leff, supra note 250, at 715–23 (developing a regime for, among other things,
determining how to allocate expenses to non-expenditure activities, such as endorsements). See
also American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 692(b) (as introduced in
the House, June 4, 2004) (treating a set percentage of income as subject to tax for violations of
the Political Activities Prohibition).
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i.e., it cannot realistically be allocated out. Accordingly, special rules
or not, it may be impracticable to tailor a more appropriate penalty
than the current one: loss of exempt status.
In addition, another potential pitfall with the taxing speech
approach is whether it would raise new concerns about penalizing
speech. Although more narrowly tailored than the current rule, it
would be a tax on speech, which could have a chilling effect. Thus,
for example, although a charity might no longer face loss of section
501(c)(3) status, each independent expenditure may have tax
consequences, which to an organization with a baseline of taxexemption would still seem like a penalty.323
The taxing speech approach would also be an exception to the
generally prevailing rule that charitable organizations may not engage
in unlimited unrelated activity.324 Because the political activity was
subject to tax, it would follow that it was not a “related” activity, even
if such terminology were not used. Due to constitutional concerns,
however, unlike other unrelated activities, the charity could engage in
as much of it as desired, so long as taxes are paid.325 This runs counter
to the very idea that a charitable organization should be organized and
operated exclusively for charitable purposes. Further, as a practical
matter, this approach does not avoid vagueness or line-drawing
problems because it would still be necessary to distinguish between
taxable speech and nontaxable speech.326

323 Because of Citizens United, this is now an issue for noncharitable exempt organizations
such as section 501(c)(4) organizations, which, after Citizens United, are subject to the section
527(f)(1) tax for independent expenditures. Aprill, supra note 18, at 392. Detailed discussion of
this issue is, however, outside the scope of this Article. See id. at 391–401 (discussing the effect
of Citizens United on noncharitable tax-exempt organizations). Additionally, if the baseline is
more appropriately that of a taxable organization, then taxation of speech is not necessarily a
penalty but just partial withdrawal of a benefit. Assuming that the proper baseline is that of a
taxable organization, revocation of section 501(c)(3) status altogether, which is the current rule,
is really just a difference of degree not of kind. Blanket revocation can and, as argued above,
should be construed as total revocation of a benefit, and not as a penalty with constitutional
dimensions. See supra Part II.C.
324 See People’s Educ. Camp Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 331 F.2d 923, 935 (2d Cir. 1964)
(ruling that “feeder” organizations that provide funds to exempt organizations are taxable,
despite their purpose to provide funds to nontaxable organizations).
325 Political activity would thus be treated better than unrelated business activity, which
also is subject to tax, and may not be unlimited because the organization would lose its taxexempt status. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69–220, 1969–1 C.B. 154 (deciding that a club was not
exempt from taxes because it was not organized exclusively for nonprofit purposes); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,108 (May 28, 1982) (examining the significance of an organization’s source of
income in determining tax exemption).
326 Also affecting the analysis is whether the “subsidy” rationale for tax-exempt status is
adopted. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the subsidy rationale. If not, then a taxing
speech approach should in theory be based on something other than tailoring the penalty to the
activity subsidized.
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D. Much Ado About Nothing? It Depends on the Deduction.
Notwithstanding these objections, of the alternatives to the
Political Activities Prohibition, a taxing speech approach probably is
the best.327 It does not involve arbitrary limits on the amount of
political activity and does not require related-unrelated distinctions.
Organizations that argue that political intervention is connected to, if
not required by, the organization’s mission likely would be satisfied,
especially (and ironically) because it would be difficult to impose a
loss of tax benefit with respect to endorsements or other types of
speech where there is no obvious expenditure. Thus, the “true”
charities, or those with substantial nonpolitical activities, that want to
dabble in politics would be able to participate in a meaningful way in
political campaigns.
Further, for those concerned about charities becoming too
immersed in politics, there would be real disincentives to political
activity. Political activity expenses, such as independent expenditures,
would likely have tax consequences. In addition, as discussed in Part
I, although endorsements and other types of campaign intervention
might not carry tax consequences, they would present their own
perils: most pertinently, that of alienating the organization’s own
constituency.328
But even if all this were an acceptable solution, there remains
another critical issue: the charitable deduction.329 If the present law
approach to the charitable deduction is retained,330 which appears to
present negligible constitutional concerns, the change to the
exemption rules might be much ado about nothing. This is because
charities that value the charitable deduction would refrain from
engaging in political activity. Further, political organizations that
might be tempted to become charity PACs (i.e., political
organizations disguised as charities) would lose a reason to organize
as a charity.331 Accordingly, unless the charitable deduction rules
327 This

is not an endorsement of the approach, however.
supra note 105 and accompanying text.
329 Other tax benefits, such as receipt of tax-exempt financing are also important to
consider. See supra note 277.
330 That approach contains no such deduction to organizations that engage in political
activity, I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2006), and, as noted in Part III.B, presents little constitutional
concerns.
331 The allure of branding political speech under the section 501(c)(c) moniker might be
significant, even without the charitable deduction. And there could still be other incentives,
namely more favorable disclosure rules. Charities, other than private foundations, are not
required to publicly disclose donors, as are political organizations. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(3). This
highlights another change that would have to be debated, whether the disclosure rules for
charities should be changed if political activity is allowed. This would become part of the
ongoing debate about disclosure. See H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (as introduced in the House, June
328 See
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were modified to allow charitable contributions to charities that
engage in political activity, changes to the exemption rules might not
achieve the goal.332
One might respond then that the charitable deduction rules
therefore should also be changed. And therein lies the rub. Here, there
are two approaches. One is just to make a blanket change to the
policy of the charitable deduction, and provide that a charitable
deduction is available irrespective of the political activity of charities.
But although Congress has the power to take such action, it is highly
doubtful that it would. The revenue consequences likely would be
significant. Arguably, such a change would result in a lot of new
charitable contributions, especially as the change would encourage
formation of new politically-oriented section 501(c)(3) organizations.
Further, apart from revenue concerns, Congress might simply not opt
for a policy that would encourage political activity by charities and
further dilute the meaning of charitable purpose. In addition, there is a
real risk of “charity capture.” Major donors might make large
charitable contributions with political intent, and subject charities to
their political preferences, thus driving the charity’s political activity.
Another option would be to attempt to retain coherence between
the charitable exemption and the charitable deduction, and follow
through on the taxing speech approach in the charitable deduction
context. This would continue the policy of nonsubsidy for political
activity and discourage donors from making contributions for
political purposes. Under such an approach, there would be some
disallowance of the charitable deduction to the extent that an
organization engages in political activity. Thus, a regime could be
established to deny a portion of a charitable deduction to donors with
respect to contributions made to organizations that engage in political
activity, in proportion to such activity.333 Or, in the alternative, the
deduction would be allowed but the organization would pay a proxy
tax on the amount of subsidy provided by the charitable deduction.334

28, 2010) (proposing additional disclosure requirements with respect to spending in Federal
elections).
332 But section 501(c)(3) could be attractive for gift tax purposes because contributions to
section 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from the gift tax whereas contributions to other
section 501(c) organizations do not have an explicit exemption. I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2). Whether,
for example, gifts to section 501(c)(4) organizations are exempt from gift tax is a subject of
considerable debate. See Aprill, supra note 18, at 384–385 (discussing the various positions that
have been taken regarding the gift tax and gifts to section 501(c)(4) organizations).
333 For example, if a donor made a contribution of $100 to a charity, 10 percent of the
activities of which were political activity, the donor would be allowed a deduction of $90
instead of the full $100.
334 Such an approach would be similar to present-law rules that ensure that otherwise
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The need for such a proxy tax regime, however, further magnifies the
problem, discussed above, of valuing the subsidy (here, the amount of
a charitable contribution that should be disallowed) for political
activities that do not have readily assignable expenses, such as
endorsements. To the extent such activities cannot be readily
captured, deductible political donations for such political activity
likely would be an enormous loophole. Thus, a serious risk of charity
capture, and substantial revenue loss, would remain.
E. Summary
In short, alternatives to the status quo, whether constitutionally
mandated or not, are unappealing. The alternatives range from the
extreme of unlimited political activity to drawing arbitrary lines
regarding the amount of permitted political activity. The former
would undermine the meaning of charity, by inviting political
purposes into the fold. The latter alternatives involve difficult linedrawing exercises that offer little-to-no improvement over present law
but without the benefits of the present Rule. Arguably, the best
alternative is taxing political activity, which would address the
putative “penalty effect” of the Political Activities Prohibition by
tailoring the penalty to the political activity. But even that might have
little practical impact absent corresponding changes to the charitable
deduction. And those changes in turn would likely leave the gaping
and undesirable loophole of politically motivated contributions and
political capture of charities by major donors.
CONCLUSION
Citizens United makes a Supreme Court challenge to the Political
Activities Prohibition likely and a reexamination of the political
speech of charities necessary. This Article has argued that although
the Political Activities Prohibition has flaws, it has largely been a
noncontroversial rule that serves important purposes. Most critically,
the prohibition draws an important line that acts as one of the few
limitations on the charitable purpose requirement. Because of the

deductible membership dues paid by businesses to exempt organizations, such as trade
associations that engage in nondeductible lobbying activity, either are not deducted or, if
deducted, tax is paid to the extent of the value of the deduction. I.R.C. § 6033(e). It already has
been proposed in Congress that the proxy tax regime be extended to the lobbying activities of
section 501(c)(3) organizations in order to deny the charitable deduction with respect to a
charity’s lobbying activity. MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG.,
INVESTIGATION OF JACK ABRAMOFF’S USE OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 54 (Comm. Print
2006).
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prohibition, charities are not allowed to get involved in politics,
which gives the charitable purpose requirement clarity and keeps the
“independent” sector independent.
Although the risks of loosening the prohibition may be overstated,
the gains from doing so are not apparent. There is real, if intangible,
benefit to a charitable sector that is noble in purpose and free of
partisan rancor. Further, there is no easy alternative to the Political
Activities Prohibition. Accordingly, this Article has argued that the
Political Activities Prohibition should be retained.
Of course, retention of the Rule would not be possible if it were
unconstitutional. Although Citizens United presents a challenge to the
constitutionality of the prohibition, close analysis of the case results
in several meaningful and critical distinctions that could and should
lead to the conclusion that the Political Activities Prohibition is not,
for constitutional purposes, a burden on speech. This is not to say that
present law is perfect—it is not. But the prohibition represents the
evolution of a century of wrestling with the subject of political
activity and charity, and the wisdom that the two are not compatible.
Such wisdom should not be contravened.

